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This research paper critically explores the transformation process of the South 
African magistracy and examines how far the institution has come in aligning 
itself with internationally accepted standards of independence. The research 
project was designed as an exploratory pilot project, first reviewing the limited 
available literature and then initiating a small non-representative set of interviews 
with such magistrates as were available. The purpose of these interviews was to 
investigate potential relevant issues which might then be followed up by a more 
systematic and representative survey. More specifically, the paper investigates 
the status of magistrates prior to 1994 with a specific focus on their relationship 
to the state, and then considers the changes that have taken place. In this regard 
the unique opportunity provided by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for 
the magistracy to examine its role in the past and make suggestions for the 
future was an important milestone in the early phases of transition to democracy. 
The magistrates' response to this transitional strategy of truth telling and its 
possible effect on transformation are examined. This is followed by an 
examination of the magistracy's current status in the context of legislative and 
institutional changes. The paper concludes that the South African magistracy 
meets the basic requirements of international standards of independence but that 
there are still significant areas of concern that need to be addressed with regards 
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1.1 Background to the problem 
Adherence to the rule of law is essential in any democracy and encompasses a 
number of fundamental principles. These include that government authority 
should be exercised legitimately and in accordance with publicly promulgated 
written laws that are binding on all people and organs of state in order to protect 
against lawlessness and anarchy. These laws should express the will of the 
citizens and people should be willing to obey them. Together these principles 
express the concept of legality (Matthews, 1971: 3). 
The concept also implies that institutional arrangements should be based on the 
doctrine of separation of powers with three distinct arms of government: the 
executive, the legislature, and the judiciary; and finally it requires the courts and 
the judiciary to be independent, impartial and free from political interference as 
they are the practical means by which the idea of legality is expressed as an 
operative principle (Matthews, 1971 :14). The principle of judicial independence 
supports the rule of law in several ways: by maintaining public confidence in the 
courts as institutions as well as in the judiciary; by supporting decision-making 
based on facts, evidence and legal argument rather than 'external direction'; and 
by reducing, the risk of assumed or actual bias in favour of government in 
disputes between citizens and government (Gleeson in Mack and Roach Anleu, 
2006: 372). 
Prior to 1994, South Africa was not a democracy. It was a country ruled by a 
government elected by a white minority which implemented laws and pOlicies 
designed to keep a nation divided on racial lines and to oppress the 











Apartheid was a system of racial segregation and systematic discrimination 
entrenched by law. But the legalistic nature of apartheid should not be confused 
with the rule of law which holds implicit that laws are able to be obeyed. The 
principles of equality before the law and the protection of human rights inherent 
in the rule of law were largely absent in the South African situation. Instead 
South Africa was governed by a policy of 'rule by law', one where its citizens 
were ruled by 'bad law' (Asmal, foreword in Dyzenhaus 1998: ix). In effect there 
were two legal systems in place: the one for black people did not meet the 
standards of the rule of law and respect for individual rights, whilst the one for 
whites treated people rather benignly (Chaskalson et ai, 1998:23). Justifiably, the 
majority of South Africans failed to see the exercise of government authority as 
legitimate. 
In the words of Chaskalson et al (1998, 22) 'any examination of the role of law in 
our society in the last thirty years must start from the recognition that law was the 
primary tool used to give effect to apartheid'. Law was used as an instrument of 
the apartheid government, and it was judges and magistrates who upheld those 
laws on a daily basis in the courts (Dyzenhaus, 1998: 27). 
The South African courts have their roots in the British colonial system of 
administration and are divided into the higher courts which are headed by judges 
and the lower courts headed by magistrates. During apartheid judges were 
appointed by the Minister of Justice and were all white and drawn from the ranks 
of senior advocates. It was widely perceived that applicants' political views were 
an influencing factor in the selection process, but in varying degrees over the 
years (Chaskalson, 1998:32). Although the political nature of appointments had 
an effect on the standards of the courts, 'nonetheless throughout the [apartheid] 
period the South African Supreme Court as a whole remained an independent 
court' (Kentridge in Friedman, 1998: 57). Judges were afforded some of the 
accoutrements of independence such as security of tenure (Gready and 











Magistrates, on the other hand, were not considered independent judicial 
officers. Section 9 of the Magistrates Court Act 32 of 1917 placed magistrates 
within the sphere of the public service. Although the Act had been amended in 
1944 to allow for appointment of magistrates by the Minister rather than the 
Governor-General, magistrates continued to be placed within the public service. 
They did not have security of tenure, received directives from the Department of 
Justice; could be investigated by the executive on charges of misconduct and 
were dependent on merit assessments for promotion or salary increases (Gready 
and Kgalema, 2000: 7-8). Before 1994 the magistracy could therefore not be 
seen as independent and impartial, but rather as compromised and part of the 
executive. 
The lower courts are separated into two tiers - the district courts which have 
criminal jurisdiction in all matters except treason, murder and rape and the 
regional courts which have jurisdiction in all matters except treason (Section 89 
of the Magistrates Court Act No 32 of 1944). A district court has the penal 
jurisdiction to impose a sentence of imprisonment of up to three years, in addition 
to a fine not exceeding an amount of R60 000 (the amount is determined from 
time to time by the Minister of Justice by notice in the Government Gazette). A 
regional court has a higher penal jurisdiction, and can impose imprisonment for a 
period not exceeding 15 years and a fine up to a limit of R300 000 (similarly 
determined by the Minister) (Section 92(1) of the Magistrates Court Act No 32 of 
1944). 
The majority of South Africans have always come into contact with the legal 
system through the magistrates' courts and it is here that more than 95% of civil 
and criminal cases are dealt with (Justice Vision 2000,1997:25). It was in the 
magistrates' courts that the systematic aspects of racial oppression such as pass 
laws, segregation laws and detentions without trials were implemented on a daily 
basis. Magistrates were seen by many South Africans as "managers in the 











Already in 1979 a Commission of Inquiry identified the undesirability of a 
compromised magistracy too closely associated with the executive branch. The 
Hoexter Commission, appointed by the Nationalist government to investigate the 
structure and functioning of the courts, found, among other things, that 
'magistrates in fact perform certain executive functions which are totally 
incompatible with the judicial nature of their office' (Hoexter Commission, 1983: 
57). It noted, too, that this gave rise to 'severe public criticism of the lower courts' 
(Hoexter Commission, 1983: 57). Recommendations from the Commission 
included the removal of magistrates from the public service and the 
establishment of an advisory body for their appointment, discipline and 
discharge, security of tenure and remuneration (Hoexter Commission, 1983: 93). 
However, the problems of a compromised magistracy identified in this report 
were ignored by government, and magistrates continued to work as public 
servants with close links to the executive until the start of the constitutional and 
structural changes brought about by the transition to democracy in the 1990s. 
South Africa's negotiated settlement for democracy ensured, on the one hand, 
that the (relatively independent) judiciary remained in place. On the other hand it 
signaled that various statutory and other initiatives would have to be 
implemented in order to address the imbalances inherited from a flawed judicial 
system and to instill public confidence in justice and the rule of law. 
Transformation of the magistracy into an independent institution commenced 
before the end of apartheid with the Magistrates Act 90 of 1993 when 
magistrates were statutorily removed from the public service. Further 
transformation has been introduced by various other legislative and structural 
changes. 
A unique element of the transformation of the South African judiciary during the 
transitional phase, was provided by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC). In effect the TRC constituted a mechanism to review and record the 











One of the greatest challenges to an emerging democracy is the issue of what to 
do with officials in the public sector who had served the prior repressive regime 
(Kritz, 1995: xxxiv). Leaving institutional structures and personnel unchanged can 
prove to be enormously problematic (Boraine, 2004:4). 
Some countries in transition have chosen to purge these officials: in post-war 
France this process was called epuration whilst in most of the former communist 
states in Central and Eastern Europe, it was called lustration (Kritz, 1995: xxxiv). 
The challenge in any such process of purging lies in the fact that the new 
government also needs to restore public confidence in the institutions of 
government yet it is these same functionaries targeted for purging who may be 
the only ones with the knowledge and experience to staff the judicial institutions. 
While justice and accountability require their purging, practical considerations 
can make them indispensable (Kritz, 1995: xxxiv). 
The courts present an interesting problem within this purge process because, on 
one hand, the rule of law requires an independent judiciary unaffected by political 
influences (Kritz, 1995: xxxv). This generally means that judges should not be 
easily removable from their posts and, even if they were, it would take years to 
train a qualified class of new lawyers and judges to replace them on the bench 
(Kritz, 1995: xxxv). Yet, on the other hand, in most countries where transition has 
taken place from an authoritarian or totalitarian regime to a democracy, the 
judiciary was severely compromised and very much a part of the old system 
(Kritz, 1995: xxxv). The South African situation of having a large part of the 
judiciary who were public servants whilst having others as nominally more 
independent exacerbated the problem. 
A recent United Nations survey on judicial officers found that 62% of those 
surveyed in South Africa had been judicial officers since before the advent of 
democracy while more than half had Afrikaans as their first language. (Redpath, 











individuals who were on the bench during the apartheid era. Unsurprisingly there 
have been public allegations and counter-allegations of racism within the 
judiciary and at the Bar. These seem to indicate that the legal sector as a whole 
has not done well in terms of transformation. The United Nations survey found 
that 52% of respondents thought that the race of the judge influenced how he or 
she judged a case (Redpath, 2005: 10). A recent survey concluded that 'most 
South Africans are doubtful about the independence and effectiveness of South 
Africa's judiciary' (Business Day: 19/7/2005).1 Similarly the United Nations 
survey found that more than half the court users surveyed had perceptions of a 
lack of independence in the courts in that they thought that government 
controlled the justice system (Redpath, 2005: 4). 
For its part, the ruling African National Congress, criticized the judiciary in a 
policy statement at its 93rd anniversary celebrations in early 2005 by saying that 
many judges and magistrates did 'not see themselves as being part of the 
masses and accountable to them ... ' It accused the judiciary of having a 
'collective mindset that was not in line with the vision and aspirations of the 
millions who engaged in the struggle to liberate our country from white-minority 
domination' (Sunday Times: 9/1/2005). Clearly many problems persist within the 
judiciary as an institution in post-apartheid South Africa, and much remains to be 
investigated as to the nature of those problems. 
At the same time, a number of strategies have been implemented to facilitate 
transformation of the judiciary. This study focuses on two transitional justice 
strategies - truth-telling ·and institutional transformation. The basic mandate of 
the TRC was to investigate gross human rights violations; however it interpreted 
this to include specialized hearings to assess the role of the entire legal sector 
(including the judiciary) in supporting state repression. These specialised 
hearings aimed at evaluating the institutional responses to human rights abuses 
as well as outlining the weaknesses in institutional structures or laws that should 
I This survey cannot be said to be representative of all South Africans (it was limited to urban areas) and the 











be changed (Hayner, 2001 :29). Yet the judiciary - both judges in the higher 
courts and magistrates in the lower courts - deliberately and conspicuously 
stayed away from the TRC's Special Legal Hearings, thus foregoing this 
opportunity for addressing its complicity with the prior apartheid regime. 
The process of transformation of the magistracy involved a number of phases 
starting with i) their statutory removal from the public service in 1993, followed by 
ii) an opportunity to assess the shortcomings of the past in the context of the 
TRC process during 1996-97, as well as iii) various more specific legislative and 
policy changes. These changes have not been guided by any overarching policy 
specifically governing the magistracy as an institution. Instead the transformation 
of the magistracy has been included in the broader goals of transforming the 
justice system as a whole. 
As will be seen in the literature review in Chapter 2 there has been very little 
research and no overall critical examination of the progress of transforming the 
magistracy to date. This thesis sets out to address the major gap in current 
research and literature on the transformation of the magistracy in the new 
democratic South Africa. Given the magistracy's key role in the justice system, it 
is important to see how far the South African lower courts have come in aligning 
themselves with internationally accepted norms. 
One of the essential elements to transformation of the judiciary in the South 
African context is the issue of representivity. Historically the South African 
magistracy was completely unrepresentative in terms of race, gender and 
language and was accountable only to a white male-dominated minority whilst 
the 1996 Constitution requires the judiciary to broadly reflect the racial and 
gender composition of the country (Section 174 (2) of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa). For the purposes of this research project, a discussion 
and analysis of representivity on the bench is not included. It is a topic that 











the subject of a thesis. Given the limits of this mini-thesis and its specific focus on 
independence, representivity as a topic has not been accommodated. 
1.2 Research Objectives 
The general aims of this research are to critically explore the transformation 
process of the South African magistracy and to examine how far the institution 
has come in aligning itself with internationally accepted standards of 
independence. More specifically, we will first investigate the status of magistrates 
prior to 1994 with a specific focus on their relationship to the state, and then 
consider the changes that have taken place. In this regard the unique opportunity 
provided by the TRC for the magistracy to examine its role in the past and make 
suggestions for the future was an important milestone in the early phases of 
transition to democracy. Examining the magistrates' response to this transitional 
strategy of truth telling and its possible effect on transformation will thus form the 
next part of our investigation. That will be followed by an examination of the 
magistracy's current status in the context of legislative and institutional changes 
and the final step will be to determine if there are any relevant issues raised 
through the research process worth pursuing in a more comprehensive future 
study. 
1.3 Research Design and Methodology 
The approach to the research project was largely determined by the fact that 
despite the key role of the magistracy in the legal system, both during apartheid 
and currently, there has been almost no substantive research or publications on 
the magistracy in South Africa. 
The study could not take the form of a literature study in the absence of 
substantial literature on the topic. Within the limits of a mini-thesis it also could 











designed as an exploratory pilot project, first reviewing the limited available 
literature (in Chapter Two), and then initiating a small non-representative set of 
interviews with such magistrates as were available. The purpose of these 
interviews was to investigate potential relevant issues which might then be 
followed up by a more systematic and representative survey. 
This study makes no claim to be comprehensive or to provide a representative 
sample of views and attitudes regarding the transformation of the magistracy. 
Magistrates' comments on and responses to transformation strategies in the 
interviews provide little more than anecdotal detail in tracing the path of 
transformation of the institution. 
A mixed methodology was used in conducting the research. Relevant legislation 
and policy documentation was utilised in order to contextualise the research 
project. Other sources included oral and written submissions to the TRC as well 
as a number of documents (minutes of meetings, memoranda and reports) 
provided by the Magistrates Commission. 
The main method of primary data collection was that of in-depth semi-structured 
interviews with a set of thirteen magistrates from the Western Cape as well as 
the former homelands of the Transkei and Ciskei in the Eastern Cape who have 
been in service from before 1994. This group was chosen in order to include both 
black and white magistrates currently in service who had also been in the 
magistracy during apartheid. 2 
The focus of the interviews and questions fell broadly into the following themes: 
(a) The magistracy under apartheid (bias, state interference, discretionary 
powers etc) 
2 One magistrate interviewed is from Polokwane. He was included because of his leadership role within the 
magistracy - he was the president of JOASA at the time of the TRC, is a regional court president, a member 
of the Magistrates Commission as well as the South African representative on the Commonwealth 











(b) The TRC Special Legal Hearings (perceptions and reasons for non-
attendance) 
(c) Views on transformation of the magistracy. 
The interviews were not used to source information about the structural position 
of the magistracy, but rather as a means to assess individual magistrates' ideas 
and responses to their environment, both in the past and in the present. 
The data set thus consisted of a review and analysis of various relevant 
documents as well as the responses to the interviews. Data analysis of the 
interview responses was conducted through content analysis with a focus on 
identifying and exploring dominant themes and patterns within the categories of 
data. Some critical analysis of the data was also conducted with a view to 
bringing out underlying assumptions and implications. 
A convenience sampling method was used. This sampling method operates 
through networks of personal contacts. It is a method in which respondents are 
selected because their responses can relatively easily be obtained, and is 
inherently biased and not representative. Because this is a pilot study it was not 
considered too problematic to use this method of sampling. Although general 
inferences could not be made about the magistracy as a whole, it created the 
opportunity to obtain at least a range of anecdotal data for the study. The 
interviewees included both urban and rural respondents as well as in terms of 
gender and race: three white males, five black males, one coloured male, two 
white females and two black females. All but one of the magistrates interviewed 
had been relocated regionally numerous times and thus collectively they 
represented a good mix of urban and rural court experiences. It was not possible 
to interview any regional court magistrates (as distinct from district magistrates) 
from the apartheid era. There are very few regional court magistrates who are 











available for a one-on-one interview.3 All the magistrates interviewed are 
currently in some kind of leadership position within the magistracy: one is a 
regional court president, three are chief magistrates, five are heads of office, two 
are regional court magistrates and two are senior magistrates. 
Interviews were conducted between January and April 2005 and were conducted 
face-to-face with the exception of one telephonic interview. Five follow-up 
interviews were conducted telephonically in May and June 2005. All face-to-face 
interviews were tape-recorded with the permission of the interviewees. Informed 
consent was obtained from all the interviewees and confidentiality guaranteed. 
Ensuring anonymity served to encourage individuals to participate and to 
facilitate the collection of good quality information. In the text of the thesis 
pseudonyms have been given to all interviewees, and an attempt has been made 
to reflect the race and/or cultural background of each with the pseudonym 
allocated to them. 
A standard interview schedule was used to ensure consistency and comparability 
of data. A fair amount of flexibility was used in the questions and in some 
instances additional probing was required in order to explore certain issues in 
more depth. 
Magistrates are not a homogenous group and the respondents reflected this 
diversity in terms of their background and socio-political location in the time-
period covered as well as in their attitudes and experiences. Rather than any 
generalisations an attempt has been made to foreground these divergent 
experiences in order to highlight their distinctive dilemmas and evasions. 
Copies of TRC written submissions and other relevant documents were 
requested from the TRC Unit in the Department of Justice and Constitutional 
3 The lack of magistrates among those interviewed who would have been acting as regional court 
magistrates under the Apartheid dispensation was especially disappointing because it is these magistrates 











Development in Pretoria in September 2004. Despite numerous follow-up phone-
calls and emails to the Unit as well as to the Chief Director of the Public 
Education and Communication Unit, these documents were not received even 













The literature on the South African magistracy poses a striking paradox that 
serves both as a major motivation for and a significant constraint on the present 
study. As already mentioned in the Introduction, the majority of South Africans 
come into contact with the justice system through the magistrates' courts and: 
it is in the Magistrates' Courts that justice is tested in its most crucial, most 
pervasive, most voluminous, most pressurized, and logistically most 
demanding dimensions - in literally thousands of cases every day ... the 
continuous struggle for the legitimacy and the efficacy of the instruments 
of justice is substantially lost or won in the Magistrates Courts. (Mohamed: 
1998:47-48) 
It is therefore surprising that whilst a substantial body of literature exists on the 
judiciary and the higher courts, almost no attention has been paid to the 
magistracy. The absence of extensive research and publication on such an 
important institution as the magistracy is a major rationale for this study; at the 
same time the lack of prior research and available literature cannot but 
significantly limit this project in turn. 
Though a substantial literature on the South African judiciary exists, it is marked 
by distinctive preoccupations and limitations. Almost all that has been written 
about the judiciary in South Africa explores issues of bias, human rights concerns 
and the relationship between justice and law. This indicates that from early on it 
was especially the complicity of the legal system with the apartheid structures 
and failures of the courts to act within a human rights framework which were 
being investigated. By comparison there is relatively little in the literature that 
deals with more general structural or institutional aspects of the judiciary. 
A number of articles have been written on various more specialized aspects of 











been written on the judiciary. These are the works by Sachs (1973), Dugard 
(1978), Corder (1982), Forsyth (1985), Ellman (1992), and van Blerk (1988). We 
will briefly deal with each of these in turn. This will be followed by a brief 
reference to Dyzenhaus (1998) which is specifically concerned with the 
judiciary's response to the TRC's special legal hearing. We will then touch on two 
recent research reports on the magistracy by Gready and Kgalema (2000). 
Sachs (1973) focuses on race discrimination within the South African legal 
system and on how the courts were used to regulate racial domination (Sachs, 
1973:11). He provides a detailed historical background to the current legal 
system, which includes some discussion about magistrates. He notes that from 
the time of Dutch occupation of the Cape from 1652, judges progressed from 
having no legal training and being in essence the judiciary, executive and 
legislature all rolled into one to being considered impartial and independent by 
the time of British colonial rule in the 1800s (Sachs, 1973:32). As well as 
employing salaried and legally trained ,judges who brought with them a sense of 
prestige and independence, the British also replaced the local officials (Ianddrost 
and heemraden) with resident magistrates in 1827 (Sachs, 1973:50). These 
magistrates were full-time employees of the Colonial government and were 
responsible for both numerous administrative tasks as well as judicial tasks. 
Much like the current situation, most of the criminal and civil trials took place in 
the magistrates' courts (Sachs, 1973:50). In general magistrates had minimal 
training and had a tendency to act as both judge and prosecutor in their courts 
(Sachs, 1973: 52). By the end of the 1800s the situation with the magistracy was 
in essence the same as it was by 1993: magistrates had no security of tenure 
and were government employees who were selected, promoted and transferred 
by the Law Department (Sachs, 1973: 52). 
Sachs also briefly discusses the situation of the magistracy in the 1960s, 
emphasizing again their lack of legal training, lack of independence and tendency 











that a text book for magistrates from the training section of the Department of 
Justice lists 18 characteristics of African witnesses for the benefit of those who 
'do not know the Bantu', encourages heavy sentences in political trials and 
recommends that magistrates don't criticize the police or legislation (Sachs, 
1973:159). 
Sachs' writing exposes the long history of the magistracy's close association with 
the executive and lack of independence as well as their lower status with regards 
judicial prestige, particularly through their lack of legal training. The main thrust of 
his book though is an analysis of judicial conduct and attitudes and he concludes 
in much the same way as later authors on the judiciary with regards their 
relationship to the executive. He discussed an increase in court action in the 
1950s which aimed at restraining government. A notable case in this respect was 
that of the judiciary preventing Parliament from ignoring entrenched clauses in 
the South Africa Act in an attempt to remove the coloured vote in the Cape 
(Sachs, 1973:248). Up until the early 1960s, various other decisions (especially 
the acquittal of the accused in the Rivonia Treason Trial in 1961) entrenched the 
judiciaries' reputation for independence (Sachs, 1973:250). But, Sachs argues, 
from 1963 onwards, with the implementation of security legislation such as the 90 
days detention laws, coupled with a growing Afrikanerisation of the bench, there 
was an increase in executive-mindedness in decision-making with an associated 
disregard for individual liberty. This trend resulted in the judiciary losing some of 
its reputation for independence (Sachs, 1973: 258). He concludes that judges 
allowed the prestige and status associated with their office to be used for the 
pursuit of injustice (Sachs, 1973:262). 
In Human Rights and the South African Legal Order (1978) John Dugard 
surveyes the laws in South Africa that contravened human rights, using the 
concept of a Bill of Rights as the standard to measure South African legislation. 
He acknowledges that most cases are in fact heard in the magistrates' courts, 











discussion did not focus much on the magistracy except to state that magistrates 
as civil servants could not be expected to display the same level of legal 
detachment from the executive as the judges. He perceived the reason critics 
look to the higher courts and not the magistrates' courts when debating 
independence and integrity was that because it is these courts that are 
responsible for the standards of justice dispensed in society and they were 
considered to be more independent than the magistrates' courts (Dugard, 
1978:280). 
More specifically Dugard discussed the implications for the judiciary of 
parliamentary sovereignty in the absence of a formal Bill of Rights so that an 
overly narrow conception of the rule of law in practice came to mean little more 
than law and order. He notes that the concept of the rule of law was distorted in 
South Africa in that there was a general failure to acknowledge the unacceptable 
nature of arbitrary government action and no attempt was made to include the 
principle of equality before the law (Dugard, 1978:42). 
Dugard considered that most of the judiciary followed the principle of legal 
positivism which implies that there is no inherent connection between law and 
morality or justice. Positivism is based on the assumption that judges in their 
decisions only need to apply the law as determined by the legislature and should 
not be evaluated as to how they satisfy the concepts of justice, the rule of law or 
democracy (Dugard, 1978: 395). In particular he noted that, in line with legal 
positivism, the courts were consistently prepared to implement statutory law 
made by parliament even at the expense of human rights. He argued that by 
following the approach of legal positivism judges were prevented from 
understanding that they had choices when deciding difficult matters of statutory 
interpretation (Dugard, 1978:393). He concluded that all those involved in the 
apartheid legal order, such as judges, magistrates, prosecutors and attorneys, 
could not avoid being contaminated by the system and that the majority passively 











through a distorted view of the rule of law; a consistent following of the principle 
of legal positivism and despite the higher courts reputation for independence, the 
'legal system fails to measure up to the requirements of a modern democratic 
society' (Ougard, 1978:49). 
In Judges at Work (1982) Hugh Corder researches the role and the attitudes of 
the South African Appellate judiciary between 1910 and 1950. His research 
revealed that to a large degree the judges submitted to the legislature and that 
racial prejudice influenced the decisions that they made. At those times when 
they could have used their discretion they seldom made decisions that favoured 
social justice and on the whole were conservative in their decision-making. 
Although he is more concerned with judicial attitudes, Corder also discusses the 
two main views about independence at that time. The first view was that judges 
were independent and impartial and that any inequality in the administration of 
justice was because of discriminatory legislation, which the courts were bound to 
apply. The second view, was that the judiciary had failed in their role as 
guardians of justice because of this dominance of legal positivism in the system 
(Corder, 1982:232). Corder tended towards the second view, and argued that 
judges were faced with a choice when interpreting law and the facts of a case 
and that due to judges ignoring the inherent inequalities in the laws and their 
failure to comprehend the plight of the majority of the accused before them, the 
standards of justice suffered and with that some of their reputation for 
independence (Corder, 1982:236). 
Forsyth (1985) examines how judges within the Appellate division between 1950 
and 1980 responded to the choices and options available to them. He found that 
in the early years, the court did indeed challenge the executive and legislative 
authorities on a number of occasions (as mentioned in Sachs' book) but that this 
was later abandoned and in the late 1950s and 1960s the court attempted to 











The issue in the 1950s around the coloured vote (discussed already in relation to 
Sachs' book), resulted in the cabinet deciding in 1955 to change the composition 
of the Appellate Division - increasing the quorum for most cases to five from 
three, except in matters concerning the validity of Acts of Parliament which would 
require eleven (Forsyth, 1985: 15). The underlying assumption of these changes 
was that in appointing more members to the Appellate Division, the executive 
could dilute the opposition with regards to the removal of the coloured vote. This 
'packing of the Bench' resulted in a strongly worded letter from the judiciary to 
government as well as serious consideration by the judges of resigning en mass 
(Forsyth, 1985:17). Ultimately it lead to a tense relationship between the judiciary 
and the executive. 
By the end of the 1950s, Steyn had been appointed as Chief Justice and this 
heralded a change in the relationship of the judiciary to the executive (Forsyth, 
1985: 30). Steyn had been a civil servant and was strongly conservative, 
resulting in a relationship with the executive that aimed at avoiding conflict and 
controversy (Forsyth, 1985: 57). Following the appointment of Steyn, Forsyth 
argued that the court increasingly avoided playing a role in the protection of 
individual rights against the state by its interpretation of security and group areas 
legislation. Forsyth concluded that although the pro-executive stance was not 
uniform, there were few exceptions to this rule (Forsyth, 1985: 226). 
Forsyth did not discuss the matter of this executive-mindedness of the courts in 
relation to judicial independence in much detail, other than to say that the 
judiciary's subservience to the executive 'must tend to undermine the courts' 
independence' (Forsyth, 1985: 226). His approach tended towards an 
assumption that the formal independence of the courts survived despite the shift 
to a more executive-minded decision making on the bench (Forsyth, 1985:38). 
In a similar vein, Stephen Ellman (1992), in In a Time of Trouble, examined the 











Appellate Division during the 1980s. Ellman argued that the Supreme Court had 
a tradition of judicial independence (Ellman, 1992:7). Although judges were 
appointed by the government, he observed that not all judges were aligned to the 
government (Ellman, 1992:227). He argued that the notion of independence was 
supported by institutional arrangements such as the fact that judges in general 
were senior counsel who came from the Bar which has a tradition of being liberal 
and independent; that most judges had already completed much of their 
professional careers by the time that they were appointed so that, unlike 
magistrates, promotion was not a compelling concern; and that judges had virtual 
life tenure once appointed (Ellman, 1992: 227-229). 
He noted that, despite the traditions of independence and even though judges 
had the potential to mitigate the worst excesses of apartheid legislation, during 
most of the 1986 state of emergency the Appellate Division under Chief Justice 
Rabie frequently vindicated emergency powers (Ellman, 1992: 113- 114). Rabie's 
successor, Chief Justice Corbett on the other hand, according to Ellman, 
demonstrated support for human rights in his decision-making (Ellman, 1992: 
142). The book focused on the 'extraordinary law' in a state of emergency, and 
therefore excluded any analysis of ordinary law. Ellman does briefly 
acknowledge that the bulk of political trials were held in the magistrates courts 
whose independence was 'by no means assured' but does not discuss the role of 
magistrates and their lack of independence in any depth (Ellman, 1992:226). 
Adrienne van Blerk (1988) wrote in defence of the judiciary and attempted to 
refute the criticism of previous researchers. She examined the nature and 
intensity of criticisms of the judiciary from a historical perspective. Criticism of the 
judiciary included racial prejudice in sentencing, allegations of acquiescence with 
the executive in state security matters and that there was political bias in 
appointments. It also included the fact that the judiciary rarely challenged 
government policy by speaking out against unjust laws, nor did they really take 











resignation. On the whole, van Blerk's work is polemical rather than analytical 
and concluded that in some cases, criticism was not fair. But she did concede 
that, on the whole, the judiciary tended towards conservatism and that their 
performance lacked a commitment to upholding democratic values (Van Blerk, 
1988: 163). 
Apart from the almost exclusive focus on the judiciary and the lack of any 
significant account of the magistracy, the literature is marked by major concerns 
with issues of judicial bias and racial prejudice rather than the underlying 
structural and institutional issues of judicial independence and separation of 
powers. At best, the literature touches on the judiciary's executive-mindedness 
but as a matter of attitudinal approach rather than as a structural issue. This 
focus has implications when we consider the issue of transformation of the 
judiciary. The literature concerned with the transformation of the judiciary would 
consider measures to change the judiciary's attitudes, their executive-minded 
approach to judging, and their inherent racism on the bench rather than 
addressing any institutional or structural changes. And in respect of the judges, 
this approach is not necessarily incorrect. The literature has revealed that the 
higher courts have a long history of being structurally and procedurally sound as 
well as internationally respected. But from the little that has been documented 
about the magistrates, it is clear that more than just an attitudinal transformation 
was going to be necessary in order to bring the lower courts in line with 
international standards of independence and impartiality. 
At the time of the TRC Special Legal Hearings and since then, most of the 
literature and commentary around these hearings has focused on the fact that 
none of the judges appeared in person. Perhaps the most significant writing 
about the Special Legal Hearings is that by David Dyzenhaus, specifically his 
book Judging the Judges, Judging Ourselves: Truth, Reconciliation and the 
Apartheid Legal Order (1998). In this, he discusses the role of judges, lawyers 











mandate of the TRC for its investigations) and analyses the Special Legal 
Hearings with a particular focus on the judiciary. 
The central theme in his book is the politics of the rule of law. He detailed much 
the same discussion as the previous authors with respect to the positivist 
argument used by most judges during apartheid versus the argument that they 
could have mitigated the worse excesses of apartheid as they had choices; as 
well as acknowledging their executive-minded approach to decision-making. 
Oyzenhaus argues that the rule of law and apartheid practices were incompatible 
and that judges could have confronted the government with a 'rule of law 
dilemma' (Oyzenhaus, 1998: 159-160). If most judges had applied the law in a 
way that considered both moral as well as legal values, the government would 
have had to either reject the rule of law in favour of apartheid, thus choosing a 
course of lawlessness; or it would have had to subject its administration to the 
limitations of fundamental legal principles (Oyzenhaus, 1998: 159). 
Against this backdrop, Oyzenhaus argued that the TRC provided an important 
opportunity for the judiciary to re-examine the relationship between law and 
justice (Oyzenhaus, 1998:35). He argued that by not confronting government with 
the rule of law dilemma, judges were accountable for allowing the unrestrained 
implementation of apartheid policy and were to some degree responsible for 
apartheid's legacy. They should therefore have appeared at the Legal Hearings 
(Oyzenhaus, 1998:160). 
Oyzenhaus examined the numerous arguments given by the judiciary in justifying 
their non-attendance at the hearings. He asserted that their attendance would 
have imparted a different tone to the hearings, as well as contributed to respect 
for the law and the judiciary in a fraught emerging democracy (Oyzenhaus, 
1998: 171). Oyzenhaus explored the concept of independence with reference to 
the relationship between state, court and individual. He argued that in 











ensure both parties are afforded equality, thus drawing the line between law and 
politics (Oyzenhaus, 1998: 172). He suggested that judicial independence 'is a 
value instrumental to judges' properly performing their role' and that despite the 
courts' formal independence, judges failed in their duty and for this they should 
have taken part in the Hearings (Oyzenhaus, 1998: 172-173) 
Finally Oyzenhaus discussed the opportunity that judges lost to debate important 
issues such as judicial appointment, the assigning of judges to cases and more 
generally, the changes needed to other institutions such as the magistracy and 
legal professions (Oyzenhaus, 1998:174). 
The only substantial texts on the magistracy during the transitional phase are two 
research reports produced by Gready and Kgalema in 20004 . Both of these 
papers were a response to the TRC Legal Hearings and suggest a shift in focus 
from issues of racism, bias and prejudice in the earlier literature to issues of 
oversight, accountability and independence. The TRC hearings exposed 
deficiencies in the lower courts that went beyond the attitudinal concerns 
highlighted by earlier authors and which demanded further investigation. 
The first report, Magistrates Under Apartheid: A Case Study of Professional 
Ethics and the Politicization of Justice (2000) focused on magistrates' experience 
of overseeing the safeguards and complaints mechanisms for those in detention 
during apartheid. The report examined this system in the context of magistrates 
own concepts of independence and the relationship between law and justice 
(Gready and Kgalema, 2000:3). As well as this, the report provided detail about 
the structural and institutional position of magistrates during apartheid, noting 
that their independence was severely compromised due to their status as public 
servants (Gready and Kgalema, 2000: 7-8). In their analysis of the safeguard 
system for detainees, Gready and Kgalema, conclude that magistrates presided 
4 Their research was based on interviews conducted with 24 magistrates and 13 other key informants which 











over a system that was designed to fail - it was a closed collaboration between 
state and its officials- and due to the way they administered the system, 
magistrates in fact made it worse (Gready and Kgalema, 2000: 18).The failure of 
the system was characterized by (i) magistrates' dual obligations to both their 
employer (the state) and the detainee and their lack of independence as public 
servants; (ii) magistrates' reports circulated only within the closed-off arena of 
government employees; and (iii)the fact that magistrates lacked control over the 
environment in which they worked and did not know what happened in response 
to their reports (Gready and Kgalema, 2000: 18-19). Magistrates' engagement 
with the system was characterized by a routinised and bureaucratic approach 
(Gready and Kgalema, 2000:3). 
Gready and Kgalema's research revealed some of the tensions in magistrates 
own understanding of the concept of independence. The majority of the 
magistrates interviewed, regarded themselves as independent. In general they 
understood interference with their independence in the narrow terms of a 
politician telling them what to do and none of those interviewed claimed to have 
experienced that kind of interference (Gready and Kgalema, 2000:41). Although 
magistrates identified inherent structural causes limiting their independence, they 
claimed it was still possible for an individual to be independent despite these 
structures (Gready and Kgalema, 2000:41-42). Gready and Kgalema argued 
that these attitudes should be seen as a retrospective device which enabled 
magistrates to distance themselves from the apartheid regime, while maintaining 
individual credibility (Gready and Kgalema, 2000:45). 
Gready and Kgalema's second report, Transformation of the Magistracy: 
Balancing Independence and Accountability in the New Democratic Order 
(2000), focused on independence and accountability in the context of three case 
studies: the TRC, the lay assessor system and social context training. The 
research focused on magistrates' reception of these strategies. It analyzed the 











magistracy under apartheid and in the post-1990 era (Kgalema and Gready, 
2000:2). In the first case study, Gready and Kgalema concluded that attendance 
at the TRC hearings would have assisted in more effectively transforming the 
magistracy as an institution (Kgalema and Gready, 2000: 14). The TRC's human 
rights violations hearings had exposed widespread abuse in the domain of the 
magistracy, and raised many questions about magisterial accountability which in 
turn had implications for independence (Kgalema and Gready, 2000: 13). They 
concluded that magistrates needed to acknowledge their past role and to engage 
with the issue of accountability both in the past and in the present in order to 
cement their future independence, and had missed an opportunity to do so by not 
attending the TRC hearings (Kgalema and Gready, 2000:14). 
The second case study focused on the lay assessor system which was 
implemented to increase community involvement in the courts and to ensure that 
presiding officers had a better understanding of the social circumstances of those 
appearing before them (Kgalema and Gready, 2000: 15-16). On the whole, 
magistrates did not have many objections to the system; concerns were raised 
about the suggestion that lay assessors share power with magistrates in 
decision-making (Kgalema and Gready, 2000:18). These concerns were raised in 
the context of the system undermining the status of the courts and 
independence. Specifically, the argument was that admittance into the profession 
required specialized training and that it was this training that allowed magistrates 
to administer justice impartially (Kgalema and Gready, 2000:18). The arguments 
failed to acknowledge the history of the magistracy in terms of its lack of 
institutional independence and also overlooked the racial and cultural divides that 
undermine the context in which magistrates have to apply the law (Kgalema and 
Gready, 2000:19). 
The final case study investigated social context training which was one of the 
longer term efforts in sensitizing magistrates to the context of those appearing 











context training as a successful strategy and one that enhances their legitimacy 
through their, magistrates, increased accountability to community needs 
(Kgalema and Gready, 2000: 24). 
In conclusion, Gready and Kgalema defined the core challenge to the magistracy 
as the need to legitimise judicial officers as well as the institution through 
accountability without losing judicial independence and that the three strategies 
identified in the case studies were a positive step in this direction (Kgalema and 
Gready, 2000: 24). The study suggested that magistrates still required significant 
engagement with the issues of independence and accountability in order to 
achieve full professional transformation (Kgalema and Gready, 2000:25). 
Overall, the later literature begins to reveal that significant structural and 
institutional shifts were necessary in order for the magistracy to legitimise itself 
as an independent judicial institution. It also reveals a culture of denial on many 
important aspects of transformation amongst magistrates such as the need to 
recognise and acknowledge the magistracy's role in the past, the issue of 
independence (and lack thereof in the past) as well as the establishment of 












TRANSFORMING THE MAGISTRACY: THE APARTHEID LEGACY AND THE 
REFORMS OF THE 1990s 
In this chapter we explore the institutional location of the magistracy during the 
apartheid years with a specific focus on their relationship to the executive and the 
impact that this had on their independence. This structural description is followed 
by a more specific description of magistrates' own experiences and perceptions. 
The dearth of relevant research and publications as surveyed in Chapter 2 has 
resulted in a reliance primarily on the limited interview data. This data has 
inherent limitations; it is often impressionistic, subjective and anecdotal. In the 
circumstances we have no choice but to use it, although with due care and 
qualifications. The magistrates' experiences are then located within the wider 
socio-political context of the time, with reference to the increasing impact of 
security measures implemented by the state. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of the various legislative and other reforms introduced in the early 
1990s and the implications of these for magistrates' independence in the new 
democratic order. 
3.1 Magistrates under Apartheid 
The use of a landdrost's court dates back to the 1600s with the arrival of the 
Dutch settlers and magistrates' courts were first introduced in the Cape Colony in 
1827 (Hahlo and Kahn, 1960:206). Magistrates' courts were introduced in Natal 
in 1846 and in the Orange Free State and Transvaal in 1902 (Hahlo and Kahn, 
1960: 223, 239 and 247). The magistrates replaced the landdrost, and were 
employed by the colonial government, performing both judicial and administrative 
functions (Sachs, 1973:50). Each colony had its own legislation for the 
functioning and jurisdiction of the magistrates' courts (Hoexter Commission, 
1983: 258). Throughout the 1800s there were already complaints about the lack 











administrative work and the 'suspicion of dependence on government goodwill 
this entailed' (Hahlo and Kahn, 1960: 216). There were calls for reforms which 
included the removal of administrative tasks from the magistracy and that 
magistrates, at least in the larger towns, should be drawn from the ranks of 
practicing advocates and attorneys (Hahlo and Kahn, 1960: 216). 
The situation of the magistracy remained relatively unchanged following the 
Union of South Africa in 1910. The Magistrates Courts Act which was passed in 
1917 entrenched a uniform model for the whole country. A new Act in 1944 
changed almost nothing and the only major change was the introduction of 
regional courts in 1957 (Hahlo and Kahn, 1960: 270). The minimum qualification 
for a magistrate was the passing of the Public Service Law Exam and 
magistrates continued with the dual functions of judicial and administrative work 
(Hahlo and Kahn, 1960: 273-274). In the years that followed the passing of the 
Act, the principle of the separation of judicial and administrative functions was 
repeatedly raised in the House of Assembly (Hoexter Commission, 1983: 258). 
The literature reviewed in Chapter 2 shows that there was a clear distinction 
between the lower and the higher courts and that, unlike magistrates, judges 
were considered independent from early in the 1800s. The Constitution of the 
Union recognized the formal separation of powers between the three arms of 
government and the South Africa Act of 1909 ensured judges' appOintment for 
life on the bench (this changed to the age of 70 years in 1912), as well as 
guaranteeing that removal from the bench for incapacity or misbehaviour could 
be implemented only by the President upon address of both houses of 
Parliament in the same session. To date, no judge has been dismissed in South 
Africa (Hahlo and Kahn, 1960:264). As the literature reviewed in Chapter 2 
reveals, concerns about the judges leaned towards criticism of their political 











3.1.1 The Institutional Location of the Magistracy and its Effect on 
Independence 
The location of the magistracy under apartheid can be characterized in terms of 
the relevant legislation. Thus magistrates were appointed by the Minister of 
Justice in terms of section 9 of the Magistrates Court Act 32 of 1944. In addition, 
they fell under the Public Service Act 54 of 1957. This Act contained provisions 
that included the regulation of conditions and periods of service, retirement, 
remuneration, discipline, transfers, promotions and dismissal of magistrates. The 
provisions of the Public Service Act thus placed magistrates clearly within the 
domain of the executive and had consequences for their independence and 
ability to preside with impartiality in court. 
The institutional location of the magistracy in relation to the Justice Department 
meant that magistrates were subject to administrative oversight and disciplinary 
control within this bureaucratic hierarchy. The Department of Justice included a 
National Inspection Services Division which was responsible for assessing 
magistrates for merit awards, promotions and salary increases, and which could 
recommend their transfer without their consent (i.e. the inspectorate was 
responsible for enforcing Public Service conditions) (Gready and Kgalema, 2000: 
8). Possible departmental inquiry by the executive for 'misconduct' was provided 
for in Section 17 of the Public Service Act and such conduct included '[a]ny act 
which is prejudicial to the administration, discipline or efficiency of any 
department, office or institution of the government'; 'publicly commenting on the 
administration of any department' as well as disobeying a 'lawful order given by a 
person having authority to give it'. Misconduct inquiries were presided over by 
other civil servants (usually magistrates) of a higher rank. If found guilty of 












The magistracy was not only institutionally located within the executive 
administration but its functions also included a mix of judicial and administrative 
responsibilities. Magistrates performed both legal and administrative duties 
especially in the rural areas. According to the TRC submission of Director-
General Noeth of the Department of Justice they were required to perform 'a 
great variety of quasi- judicial and administrative functions ... on behalf of 
government departments which had no representation in specific communities'. 
These tasks included managing applications for state pensions and grants, 
marriages, overseeing elections, determination of cases in need of care, granting 
of citizenship, functions relating to taxes and stamp duty and so on (Noeth,1997: 
9,10). The magistrate was usually also the chairperson of the agricultural credit 
committee, licensing board, rent control board and industrial school in his/her 
district (Department of Justice, 1998: 41). All of this had major implications for 
perceptions of their institutional independence, but was not identified as 
problematic at the time by the Department of Justice. In fact, the Department of 
Justice's annual report for July 1989-June 1990 stated that '[the magistrate] is 
often regarded by the community as the senior representative of the State in the 
rural areas' (Department of Justice, 1990: 58). 
The implications of this fusion of administrative and judicial functions for 
perceptions of the lack of independence of the magistracy were exacerbated 
under apartheid. The lower courts were responsible for dealing with many of the 
laws that entrenched the systematic discrimination of apartheid such as the pass 
laws, riotous assembly and influx control laws, granting of detention without trial, 
and overseeing the complaints and safeguard system in relation to political 
detainees.5 Magistrates were required to record confessions, visit detainees as 
well as preside over inquests of custodial deaths (Gready and Kgalema, 2000: 
3). The political overtones and potential government interest in these kinds of 
matters would have made their impartiality questionable given their status as 
5 For a detailed discussion on the role of magistrates within the complaints and safeguard system, see 
Gready and Kgalema, 2000: 'Magistrates under Apartheid: a case study of professional ethics and the 











public servants. A 1991 report by the Law Commission highlighted these 
concerns stating that criticism in these kinds of cases existed 'often simply 
because magistrates are civil servants' and that their status created an 'outward 
impression that they are political tools in the hands of government'. The report 
concludes that this seriously impaired the image of the administration of justice in 
South Africa (Law Commission, 1991: 200). 
At higher levels, too, the institutional location of the magistracy under apartheid 
proved problematic. The Magistrates Court Amendment Act of 1952 provided for 
the establishment of regional courts, which had wide powers and greater 
jurisdiction than the district courts. In an attempt to bolster the status of the 
magistracy at this senior level, magistrates had to meet special academic and 
professional qualifications. Incumbents of these posts were to hold an LLB 
degree or a Civil Service Higher Law Certificate and to have had at least ten 
years of service, making them the 'elite'. District court magistrates were required 
only to have a B.Juris or Civil Service Law Certificate. However, since the 
regional courts were responsible for dealing with the majority of the political trials 
that took place in the 1970s till the early 1990s they proved especially 
controversial, increasingly becoming the objects of political protest. 
Despite its notional 'independence', the position of the magistracy in the 
homelands did not differ significantly from that in the Republic.6 The appointment 
and conditions of service of magistrates in the former homelands, such as the 
Transkei and Ciskei, mirrored those of their counterparts in the Republic almost 
exactly (TRC Report Vol 1, 1998:479). Moreover, political conditions in the 
Republic were largely replicated in the homelands - for example, they had similar 
security legislation providing for detention without trial, and declared states of 
emergencies at much the same time as in the Republic. Despite the homelands 
policy, their administration of justice remained closely tied to the South African 
state. The homeland police forces were subject to significant control by the South 











African Police (SAP) and core members from the SAP were drafted into the 
homeland police. The security police in the Republic also moved freely across 
borders in the execution of their duties (Rauch, 2000:1) Staff from the 
Department of Justice in the Republic were occasionally seconded to the 
homelands as well (Department of Justice, 1998: 29). 
In short, the overall picture of the institutional location of the magistracy shows a 
systematic fusion of administrative and judicial functions under the control of the 
executive branch of government. Structurally this pre-empted the possible 
independent function of the magistracy, the consequences of which were further 
exacerbated by the important and highly visible role of the magistracy in the 
implementation of apartheid and security legislation. 
3.1.2 Experience and Perceptions of Magistrates under Apartheid 
In the previous sub-section we provided a basic institutional and structural 
account of the location of the magistracy under apartheid. This needs to be 
complemented by a more concrete description of the actual experience and 
perceptions of magistrates of the functioning of the magistracy during this period. 
The problem, as we saw in the literature review of Chapter 2, is that there is a 
great lack of relevant research, documentation and publications. In the 
circumstances we can only begin to fill this gap by drawing on the limited number 
of interviews with magistrates conducted for the purposes of this pilot study. 
While this can have no pretence at comprehensiveness or representativity it may 
nevertheless be helpful in filling out the picture in more particular terms. In order 
to protect their confidentiality, each interviewee was assigned a pseudonym. An 
attempt has been made to reflect the race and/or cultural background of each 
person with the pseudonym assigned to them. 
In various ways the magistrates who were interviewed confirmed that, certainly in 











The interviews also provide some indications as to how government had ensured 
that they were a functional part of the apartheid state machinery. This is the 
response by Magistrate 'Smith' on the issue of the independence of the 
magistracy under apartheid: 
There was lots of stuff. We were told we weren't allowed to criticise any 
state organs, so if the police did a bad job, you weren't allowed to say 
they'd done an appalling job and to get their act together. .. that kind of 
control (Interview with 'Smith'). 
Magistrate 'Brown' remembered being sent a directive from the Department of 
Justice in the 1970s that they were never to criticise the police from the Bench 
(Interview with 'Brown'). The former Director-General of the Department of 
Justice, Jasper Noeth, confirmed this practice in his oral submission to the TRC 
with reference to a departmental code of conduct: 
'[T]he code stated that magistrates shouldn't criticize police in open court. 
They should rather direct their criticisms afterwards to the minister of 
police or the commissioner of police, whoever it was' (Director-General 
Noeth's oral submission to the TRC). 
This 'code' was adopted under Section 17 of the Public Service Act referred to on 
page 27 and implied a sanction for possible misconduct if ignored. A number of 
magistrates interviewed stated in different ways that the Chief Magistrates 'sorted 
out any verlig (liberal) magistrates' (Magistrate 'Lombard') or 'tended to interfere' 
(Magistrate 'Dlamini') or reprimanded them for making decisions they didn't like -
for example Magistrate 'de Wet' mentioned that if he turned down police 
applications for detention without trial, he often received a call from the Chief 
Magistrate berating him for 'making the work of the police difficult for them' 
(Interview with 'de Wet'). However, it also becomes clear that magistrates 
sometimes were not only civil servants by law, but also willing implementers and 
supporters of the policies of the day. They needed to support the official policy 
and to toe the party line if they wanted to be promoted and their independence 











In general, the interviews with the magistrates reflected a pervasive sense of 
control which permeated their daily experiences. In this connection the 
Departmental Inspectorate was perceived as playing a vital role through 
imposing transferrals and other sanctions. Magistrate 'Lombard' spoke about this 
as a general 'policy': if magistrates acted in a way that displeased the 
Department they would often receive a telegram giving them one month's notice 
that they were being transferred to another office (Interview with 'Lombard'). 
Magistrate 'Smith' echoed similar sentiments: '[c]ertainly it was a known thing 
that, if you offended the powers that be, you would be transferred' (Interview with 
'Smith'). 
All magistrates interviewed who had been based in the Republic seemed in 
agreement that the Inspectorate was a means by which the Department kept 
control over them. The only exceptions were the two magistrates who at some 
stage in their careers had been a part of the Inspectorate. The common 
perception of other magistrates was articulated by Magistrates 'Brown' and 'de 
Wet': 
'They [i.e. the Inspectorate] were the Gestapo of the Department ... They 
were terrible ... They went to Pretoria where they train you how to lose your 
sense of humanity ... and to become a monster' (Interview with 'de Wet'). 
'They struck terror into us ... they were ruthless' (Interview with 'Brown'). 
Magistrates from the former homelands seemed not to have had the same 
perception of the role of the Inspectorate presumably because the Inspectorate 
did not cover their areas and the homelands did not appear to have had their 
own Inspectorate divisions. 
Magistrate 'Lombard' vividly recalled the sometimes uncomfortable 
consequences of the closeness between the executive and the magistrates. His 
account of an incident involving the anti-apartheid leader Allen Boesak may be 
cited at some length for what it reveals of the nature of the interaction between 











It was then in 1982 ... 83, I think. That time when Boesak was arrested. 
The Attorney-General called to tell me that he [Boesak] would be 
appearing at my court. I was in Malmesbury then.7 A team of us there in 
Malmesbury worked on the case and we decided that his bail conditions 
could be changed and that he could be given back his passport and his 
money. But now this was all before going to the court in the morning. And 
then early, before court had started the other magistrate, my colleague, he 
got a phone call from the Minister of Justice asking him what the 
judgement would be. And he told him. My colleague, he told him before 
we had even gone to court. And so when Boesak got back to Cape Town 
later that morning, the Minister had got the, what were they then ... lnternal 
Affairs ... whatever ... the Home Affairs guys ... to wait for him, so as soon as 
he arrived they took his passport away again (Interview with 'Lombard'). 
Lombard's account of this incident may serve as a model case of political 
interference by the executive and the security officials in the outcome of judicial 
processes at the time. Significantly it also indicates some measure of conflicting 
interests and objectives between the local magistracy and their administrative 
superiors with Magistrate 'Lombard', at least in retrospect, was well aware of the 
problematic nature of such executive interference. If there was little or no attempt 
by the magistracy to assert their independence from the apartheid government, 
there was also no attempt to justify the interference they experienced which was 
evidently perceived as improper. 
'De Wet's' experience also indicates the ways in which the law could be used by 
magistrates prepared to mitigate some of the excess of apartheid policy. He 
states: 
I made it very difficult for them [the police] to succeed with an application 
[for detention without trial]. That was the only way that I could ... resist 
within the boundaries of what was placed before me ... because there is 
only one little section in the Act which said 'you have to satisfy the 
7 Political cases in the Western Cape were often heard in magistrates' courts in one of the smaller towns 











magistrate' and then of course I would go through the papers with a fine 
toothcomb ... 1 would look for mistakes and I would look for something that 
would not justify the application (Interview with 'de Wet'). 
The experiential data as expressed by magistrates themselves supports the 
problematic location of the magistracy within the realm of the executive as well 
as the associated implications for independence. But in order to understand why 
magistrates generally seemed so willing to acquiesce to executive control, it is 
important also to understand the wider socio-political context of South African 
society at the time. 
3.1.3 The socio-political context 
In important ways the functioning of the magistracy as part of the apartheid state 
was tied up with the politics of Afrikaner Nationalism. Adam & Giliomee have 
described the rise of Afrikaner nationalism based on the mobilization of ethnic 
power involving a range of cultural, economic and political associations including 
coordinating secret societies such as the Afrikaner Broederbond (Adam & 
Giliomee, 1979). After 1948, when the National Party came into power, state 
patronage was systematically used in a process which Seegers has termed the 
"Afrikanerisation of the South African state" (Seegers, 1993). Amongst other 
things this involved a gradual trend of filling key positions within the state with 
nationalist-minded Afrikaners so that by the 1970s major positions and 
institutions within the state were dominated by Afrikaners. This amounted to 
using the public service as a means to provide Afrikaners with employment and 
skills rather than as a means to develop a civically-minded sector in the Western 
European manner (Seegers, 1993: 478). In practice this also meant that access 
to, and promotion in, state bureaucracies such as the magistracy became closely 












Formed in 1918, the Broederbond's core goal was to further Afrikaner 
nationalism by protecting Afrikaner culture, developing an Afrikaner economy, 
and gaining control of the South African government (O'Meara, 1983: 59, 61). 
The Broederbond had different roles and significance at different stages of its 
history but after 1948 it increasingly functioned as a crucial clearing house and 
informal dispenser of patronage under the National Party government. By the 
1960s and 1970s the Broederbond's membership was considered to represent 
the elite of the Afrikaner social and cultural leadership and included the vast 
majority of the National Party cabinet ministers and parliamentarians (Serfontein, 
1979: 13). The membership lists provided by Serfontein in his book significantly 
include the names of a number of magistrates. The interviews conducted by 
Gready and Kgalema confirm the strong influence of the Broederbond amongst 
magistrates themselves. One interviewee stated that most members of the 
Ministry of Justice were members of the Broederbond and that membership was 
a prerequisite for becoming a Chief Magistrate (Kgalema and Gready, 2000: 8). 
The role of the Broederbond in "Afrikanerising" the magistracy along particular 
political and ideological lines is reflected in the responses of the magistrates 
interviewed for this thesis project. Thus magistrate 'De Wet's' experience as a 
liberal white Afrikaner indicates the pressures on Afrikaners to conform with the 
ruling ideology and the potential exclusion for failing to do so: 
... and then you know of course the Broederbond made no secret of it that 
you won't come in with us if you don't do what we want you to do. I was 
approached about three or four times to become a Broederbonder but I 
didn't qualify because I didn't do what they expected me to do (Interview 
with 'de Wet'). 
Non-Afrikaners, too, were well aware of the Broederbond's significance. 
Interviewees' experiences reflect some of these trends. Magistrate 'Bikitsha' 
stated that: 
As far as I know, almost everybody up there [Pretoria] were members of 











weren't based on the law but that they were guided by 'the Policy' 
(Interview with 'Bikitsha'). 
Mr Lee Bozalek in an oral submission to the TRC also mentioned the perceived 
link between Broederbond membership and high ranking positions within the 
magistracy: 
[a] book called the Super Afrikaners ... a list of Broederbond members 
which they listed as an appendix and there I found the names of two 
Regional Court magistrates ... 1 also have little doubt that their membership 
of the Broederbond was directly linked to ... their appointment as Regional 
Magistrates (Oral submission to the TRC Special Legal Hearings, Lee 
Bozalek). 
This generalised perception is further supported by JOASA (the Judicial Officers 
Association of South Africa) in its written submission to the TRC in which it states 
that 'some judicial officers belonged to both covert and overt formations that were 
known to toe some political line' (JOASA, 1998:7). It goes on to list some seven 
examples of organizations including the Broederbond. For our purposes the point 
is not so much whether such statements can provide any conclusive evidence 
regarding the much-contested activities of a secret society like the Broederbond 
but rather that they act as testimony expressing perceptions of the SOCially and 
politically compromised position of the magistracy. 
It should be stressed that such pressures on the magistracy did not emanate 
from the Broederbond only, but was part and parcel of the general social and 
political context of white and Afrikaner SOCiety under apartheid. Magistrate 'de 
Wet' described the racist social context in which he operated (in a small, 
predominantly Afrikaans town) indicating the social sanctions placed on those 
who did not abide by the prevailing norms: 
It was very difficult for me and I never discussed it with any of my 
colleagues ... but I always felt that if you would punish a black person or a 
coloured severely, people would jump up and say you're the best. If a 











warning. They expect you to wipe his nose with a double-ply twinsaver, 
pat him on the back and say: look guy this isn't right but don't do it next 
time. I remember that I had to sentence a guy for assault, a white farmer, 
who assaulted one of his labourers and the next morning when I got 
up ... there was a box with a chicken pulled into pieces lying outside my 
door with all sorts of broken knife blades, half a sickle, those kinds of 
things (Interview with 'de Wet'). 
As a liberal Afrikaner who did not always behave 'as expected' in the racist 
context of the apartheid social and legal order, Magistrate 'de Wet' recalled 
another telling episode which brought him in conflict with the security police: 
Yes, I was visited ... the [now] honourable Judge Sandi in the Eastern 
Cape division ... He was one of the first black attorneys to appear in my 
court. We were experiencing temperatures of minus 15 in the winter ... My 
office was the only one with a little anthracite fire in the corner. So I invited 
him into my office and he refused at first, he said 'I can't come in here'. So 
then I said to him 'I don't give a damn about the system this is human stuff 
we are talking. We are both qualified in the law' ... and I invited him into my 
office and he wouldn't sit at first and said 'I can't sit on your chair' and I 
said 'its your choice if you sit on my chair ... Iook, I promise you I won't 
come and look to see if your colour is left behind on my chair' and we 
laughed about that. I offered him tea and he said 'I can't drink tea out of 
your cup' and I said to him 'Mr Sandi please, you have to'. When he left. .. 
that was a Thursday ... the Friday morning ... there was a knock on the 
window ... my office was right next to the main entrance and when I looked 
up I realised there was a police car standing opposite the street...Two 
guys from the security police they flipped their 1.0. cards to me, I couldn't 
see it, it was quick. 'We are from the security police and we believe that 
you, you support the blacks, the black people'. And I said 'how did you 
arrive at that'? 'Well, you know we received a call that you entertained a 











choice, he's a qualified man ... and I called him in because it was bitter cold 
outside' (Interview with 'de Wet'). 
Magistrate 'de Wet's' account provides an extreme instance of the force of racist 
social prejudices and practices under apartheid to the extent that deviations from 
the racist norms were perceived as security threats. Significantly his account also 
provides some testimony of the countervailing influence of human and 
professional solidarity at the height of apartheid. 
3.1.4 The increasing impact of the security context 
From the mid-1970s and in response to the "Total Onslaught" on white South 
Africa and the apartheid order there was an increased militarism in state 
decision-making, management and policies. Under P.W, Botha the militarization 
of the South African state culminated in the 1980s in the National Security 
Management System (NSMS) which was a 'hierarchy of committees overseeing 
bureaucratic work from the highest to the lowest echelons (Seegers, 1993: 478). 
The "securocrats" became increasingly powerful in the management of the state 
at all levels, with significant impact on the magistracy as well. Although 
magistrates were not formally represented on these committees at national or 
local level, there were informal contacts between the judiciary and members of 
these committees - specifically the military intelligence sector and the police. 
This contact often centred on the treatment of political detainees (Seegers: email 
to the researcher: 22/7/2005). 
A notorious instance of this kind of pressure exerted by the security authorities 
on the magistracy occurred in 1985 when magistrates and prosecutors in Durban 
attended a meeting at police headquarters where the security police gave 
briefings and showed video clips on political unrest. The videos apparently 











orchestrated attempt to inform the courts on what 'was really happening in the 
country' (Haysom et ai, 1986:122). 
Significantly, the judiciary actually objected to this as improper interference with 
the integrity of the judicial process in the magistrates' courts. Following public 
reports of the meeting, the Judge President of Natal recommended that the thirty 
or so magistrates who had attended should not preside at trials and hearings in 
'unrest' cases. It was not the content of the programme that concerned the 
Judge, but rather the presentation of opinions of police officers as fact that he 
objected to (Haysom et ai, 1986:122). 
The interviews conducted with magistrates from the apartheid period reflect 
pervasive pressures from the security forces going back to the period before the 
National Security Management System (NSMS). Thus magistrate 'Lombard'told 
of attempts by the security police to recruit him as an informer: 
I was an acting magistrate then, but also in my first year of studies ... that 
time when I was in Groot Marico. The security police came to me and 
made me an offer. They made me an offer that I could go to Wits and that 
they would pay all my expenses so long as I would promise to try and 
infiltrate all the organizations. You know the ones with the 'verligtes' 
[liberals] and the anti-government ones. But I refused (Interview with 
'Lombard'). 
It seems unlikely that this 'offer' was a once-off event given the revelations at the 
TRC of the extent to which the security forces made use of informers to infiltrate 
anti-government organizations and activities (TRC Report Vol 2, 
1998: 137, 141,386). Lombard's statement raises the question of possible other 
cases of magistrates taking up such offers which would clearly have had an 
impact on their impartiality on the bench at a later stage. 'Lombard' gave a 












Another time, it was also when I was at Groot Marico, it was then when 
they kept the 'terrorists' in that 90 days detention. It was maybe around 
1972, I think. And they had a guy there and I took his confession. Later, 
the next day or so, the security police called me and asked me if I would 
redraft the confession. What they had done, they had deleted parts of that 
confession and then wanted me to rewrite it for court (Interview with 
'Lombard'). 
The role of the security police in intimidating magistrates who did not toe the line 
was also reported by a number of the black magistrates interviewed. Their 
accounts reflect the blurred lines of authority between the magistracy in the 
homelands and other state organs such as the security police in the Republic. 
Magistrate 'Olamini' stated: 
Yes, there was overt state interference ... your decisions were questioned. The 
executive was definitely not hesitant to get into the arena. I personally had a 
confrontation with the then agents from BOSS [security forces] during that time 
of the upheavals over the country. At that time, most of those who were 
arrested, the black youths who were arrested and whose injuries [by the 
police] were on record, they were just dismissed by the whites. But we, most 
of the black magistrates at the time, we were proactive and we did give such 
people a chance. So things like to exercise the right to legal representation, 
medical assistance and for placing on record their injuries. For that, one 
attracted a visit from the security police (Interview with 'Olamini'). 
Magistrate 'Oyosi' echoed this experience of visits and intimidation by the 
security police: 
Of course there was state interference. In one case, I remember I was still 
a prosecutor and it was a case with youths ... students ... and they were 
acquitted and then after this two security branch guys were waiting and 
they asked me why were they acquitted and they threatened me ... we 











And then, I mean, it wasn't even me, the prosecutor, who made the 
decision. It was the magistrate who acquitted them (Interview with 'Oyosi'). 
Magistrate 'Bikitsha' recounted that when he was a prosecutor he had been 
identified as an activist and that 
you knew that people were spying ... one would be careful ... of your 
movements ... of everything. It was a very stressful situation. You knew 
someone was watching you (Interview with 'Bikitsha'). 
Magistrate 'Oyosi' also spoke of being detained and imprisoned as an activist 
when she was a young prosecutor and how she felt the security forces were 
always watching her after that. Her explanation of intimidation perhaps speaks 
best of the way in which government worked at ensuring that the homeland 
courts were compliant with government policy: 
By the time you were a magistrate, the interference, you could say was 
more indirect. Because by then they had built on your fear that they had 
built into you as a prosecutor. So by the time you were a magistrate you 
were afraid to make any decision that was against the government 
(Interview with 'Oyosi'). 
The experience of black magistrates brings with it intrinsic complexities and 
problems for the sake of analysis. On the one hand, it could indicate that black 
magistrates were subject to more coercive and direct pressures from the state 
than their white colleagues, yet on the other hand it may indicate that we need to 
make some allowances for self-justifying perspectives especially in light of the 
problematic 'collaborative' role that black magistrates and prosecutors found 
themselves in. They have an inherent interest in distancing themselves from 
these roles both at the time and in retrospect. At the same time, it is possible that 
some black magistrates may have had personal views at odds with their official 
roles, or even engaged in dual strategies. 
In brief, the magistracy was clearly used as a tool by various arms of the state to 











support such action actively was irrelevant, as the institution and system itself 
was designed to be a vehicle of state policy. This indicates that, despite concerns 
that may be raised about individual attitudes and motivations, the key problems 
with regards the independence of the magistracy were in respect of its structural 
location and magistrates' institutional roles within those structures. Central to any 
transformation strategy would have to be significant structural and institutional 
changes. 
3.2 The Magistracy in a New Democratic Order 
Significantly, attempts to reform the South African magistracy did not start with 
the new Constitution or only after 1994. Already in November 1979 the State 
President appointed a commission of inquiry into the structure and functioning of 
the courts (the Hoexter Commission) with the broad mandate to 'inquire into the 
structure and functioning of the courts ... and to make recommendations on the 
efficacy ... and on the desirability of changes' (Hoexter Commission:1983:1). It is 
unclear what precipitated the need for the establishment of the Commission, but 
it appears to mainly have been intended to investigate the Appellate Division, the 
desirability of establishing an intermediate court to replace the regional courts 
and the desirability of establishing a family court and implementing some form of 
machinery to settle minor civil disputes (Hoexter Commission, 1983:2). 
The Commission invited interested people to make representations and sent a 
questionnaire to judges, advocates, attorneys, magistrates and faculties of law at 
the universities. It received some 1264 written submissions and 205 oral 
presentations (Hoexter Commission, 1983: 7). 
In reference to the lower courts, the report noted that many of the submissions to 
the Commission had paid considerable attention to the magistracy's close ties to 
the executive. These submissions noted that on the grounds of the doctrine of 











with officials of the executive and many objected to the fact that magistrates 
presided over trials with political overtones in which the government had an 
interest (Hoexter Commission, 1983: 56-57). The witnesses who appeared 
before the Commission were almost unanimous in their view that all judicial 
officers should be independent (Hoexter Commission, 1983: 323). 
One strongly worded submission from Judge Didcott of the Natal Provincial 
Division stated that the relationship between the Department of Justice and the 
magistracy resulted in incompatible functions with inherent conflicts that harmed 
the image of justice. He recommended that a strict separation between the 
Department of Justice and magistracy was to be enforced and that the 
magistrates' courts become purely judicial in function (Didcott, 1980: 664).8 
The Commission's own findings echoed Didcott's sentiments, finding that 
'magistrates in fact perform certain executive functions which are totally 
incompatible with the judiCial nature of their office' and that this gave rise to 
'severe public criticism of the lower courts' (Hoexter Commission, 1983: 57). The 
report emphasised the lack of necessary safeguards for independence through 
the fact that: (i) magistrates were transferred without their consent; (ii) they were 
dependent on merit assessments for promotion and salary increases; (iii) they 
were liable to departmental inquiry by the executive and, if found guilty of 
misconduct could have their salaries reduced; and finally that, (iv) their salaries 
were 'totally inadequate' (Hoexter Commission, 1983: 75-76). 
Recommendations from the Commission included the removal of magistrates 
from public service and the establishment of an advisory body (Hoexter 
Commission, 1983: 93). This advisory body was to consist of an independent 
regional court advisory board and an independent district court board made up of 
competent judicial officers who were to be appointed by the State President 
B Copies of the submissions to the Commission were not available at the time of the research project. Judge 
Didcott's submission was published in an edited form in the South African Law Journal together with a 
number of other submissions. Didcott's submission was the only one published that made specific reference 











(Hoexter Commission, 1983: 326). The regional board should be chaired by a 
judge with seven chief regional magistrates as members; whilst the district 
advisory board should be chaired by a chief regional magistrate with seven chief 
district magistrates as members (Hoexter Commission, 1983: 342). The boards 
should deal with all matters pertaining to the appointment, transfer, discipline and 
discharge of magistrates, advising the executive on these matters. The 
Department of Justice's only involvement should be to deal with the 
administration of the courts and to make proposals to the boards about 
administration and co-ordination (Hoexter Commission, 1983: 344). 
Other recommendations included that magistrates' conditions of service should 
be protected by statute, no magistrate should be transferred without his or her 
consent and that a LLB should be the minimum academic qualification for entry 
into the service (Hoexter Commission, 1983: 42-43). The report also noted that, 
as part of the move towards greater independence, magistrates should be 
recruited from all racial groups within the private sector (Hoexter Commission, 
1983:371 ). 
The Hoexter Commission's report signalled for the first time in an official 
document, a principled recognition for the need to separate the judicial functions 
of the magistracy from the sphere of the executive and to increase the 
professional status of magistrates as judicial officers. The report also shows that 
an awareness of the need to reform the magistracy was in place long before any 
attempts at transforming the institution were implemented as part of the transition 
to democracy. Its proposals were a radical departure from the status quo in 
suggesting the lower courts be granted complete independence with an 
autonomous co-ordinating body, as well as recognising the undesirability of a 
predominately white bench drawn only from the public service. 
Thus, as early as the beginning of the 1980s, the Nationalist government was 











magistracy. However, there is little or no indication that anything was done about 
this. This could be linked to the increased militarisation of the state with its 
associated security concerns during the 1980s.The Hoexter Commission's 
recommendations may well have been too radical and egalitarian at a time when 
the state was deeply concerned with the preserving white domination and 
Afrikaner control. 
The Department of Justice's annual reports for the period 1983 -1992 indicate 
that no attention was paid to the Commission's concerns about the magistracy's 
closeness to the executive. The reports do however refer to other 
recommendations from the Commission that were taken up, such as setting up a 
committee to investigate the division between the administrative and legal work 
of magistrates (Department of Justice, 1984: 24), the establishment of a small 
claims court in 1985 and the establishment of a Rules Board in 1987(Department 
of Justice, 1989: 5). The first acknowledgement by the Department of the need 
for separation of the judiciary from the legislature and executive came in the 
1990-1991 annual report in which it was noted that there was a need for a 
'clearer' notion of the independence of the bench in order to meet the demands 
of a constitutional state (Department of Justice, 1991: 1). This of course was on 
the eve of the negotiated settlement for a democratic South Africa. The 1991-
1992 annual report noted that the position of the magistracy should be examined 
with a view to statutorily entrenching magistrates' independence (Department of 
Justice, 1992:26). The report saw these changes as integral to further 
constitutional development and in line with both the Hoexter Commission's report 
as well as more recent recommendations of the Law Commission in its Report on 
Constitutional Models (Department of Justice, 1992: 26). The Law Commission's 
report had emphasised that as magistrates were functionaries of the executive 
'various matters casting suspicion on their independence can be identified' (Law 
Commission, 1991 :199). The report echoed the concerns of the Hoexter 
Commission and recommended that, as with the judges, a structure like the 











deal with district and regional court magistrates separately, and which would deal 
with all matters pertaining to the magistracy (Law Commission, 1991: 200). 
It is in against this background that the Magistrates Act 90 of 1993 was passed 
(still under the NP government and prior to the adoption of the new Constitution 
and establishment of a democratic parliament). It statutorily removed magistrates 
from the public service and established a new body, the Magistrates 
Commission, as the responsible authority. The Act served to 
provide for the establishment, constitution, objects and functions of a 
Magistrates Commission; to further regulate the appointment and 
remuneration of, and vacation of office by, magistrates; to provide that 
certain conditions of service of magistrates and other judicial officers may 
be determined by regulation; and to provide for matters in connection 
therewith (Preamble to the Magistrates Court Act 90 of 1993). 
The removal of the magistracy from the public service and the creation of an 
independent Magistrates Commission by the NP government on the verge of 
losing its own considerable and long-standing executive powers were perceived 
as an obvious political ploy. Comments from opposition party politicians during 
the parliamentary debate at the tabling of the Bill indicated the scepticism with 
which this proposed statutory change was met: 
Why is it that at five minutes to midnight, this government is suddenly 
charged with giving statutory effect to the independence of the magistracy 
when in fact it has hedged about that question over the past 10 years with 
all sorts of reasons ... ? (AJ Leon) (Hansard 7 June 1993: column 10294). 
And again: 
Why ... as the NP prepares to leave office and hand over the government 
to a more representative grouping ... the minister suddenly finds it essential 
to give magistrates a statutory protection ... from an executive that the NP 
will no longer control? (OJ Dalling) (Hansard 7 June 1993: column 10310). 
Despite these misgivings, the Act was implemented, effectively removing 











establishing a Magistrates Commission. Considering that the need for reform had 
been raised in the public domain some ten years prior to its implementation, it 
was an Act that could only be received with some ambivalence. But in principle, 
the removal of the magistracy from the control of the executive had to be 
welcomed and the establishment of the Magistrates Commission was a step in 
the right direction. 
The Magistrates Commission was established in terms of section 2 of the Act to 
'ensure that the appointment, promotion, transfer or discharge of, or disciplinary 
steps against judicial officers in the lower courts take place without favour or 
prejudice, and that the applicable laws and administrative directions in 
connection with such action are applied uniformly and correctly.' In terms of 
section 3(1 )(a) of the Act, the Commission consisted of ten members who were 
all designated by judicial officers or the legal profession except for the Chief 
Director of Justice College and the officer of the Department of Justice 
designated by the Minister. No politicians were appointed on the Commission. 
The power of appointment was therefore vested in the professions concerned 
and not in the executive or legislature. 
Section 4 of the Act sets out various objects of the Commission such as to 
'ensure no influencing or victimization of judicial officers in the lower courts takes 
place'. Section 4 also sets out the role of the Commission in attending to 
grievances of, and complaints against, magistrates, misconduct investigations 
against magistrates and advising and/or making recommendations to the Minister 
regarding numerous matters such as appointments of magistrates and regional 
magistrates, promotions, salaries, legislation etc'. The Commission's role though 
is only advisory - final decisions rest with the Minister, except in the case of 
dismissals, which rest with Parliament (after suspension of the magistrate by the 
Magistrates Commission). Finally, section 4 ensures that the Commission is 












The first meeting of the Commission was held in December 1993. Its 
membership was all male and almost exclusively white and Afrikaans - there was 
one Indian member. Meetings were held in Afrikaans. Despite having been a 
major step in securing the magistracy's independence, the Commission was 
widely criticised as a conservative body which 'sent out very strong signals, no 
change' (Fourie, quoted in Kgalema and Gready, 2000: 5). In September 1994 
the Commission adopted a resolution to reconstitute itself in order to make it 
more representative (email to the researcher from the Secretary of the 
Magistrates Commission 18/10/2004). At the same time, the Interim Constitution 
which came into effect in 1994 (as well as the final Constitution of 1996) changed 
the legal order in the country and had inherent transformative ideals which 
implied that the composition of institutions was going to have to change and the 
Commission's clear association with the old NP government was incompatible 
with these ideals (Van Rooyen 2002 (8) BCLR 810 (CC) at para 50A-D). 
In order to accommodate the resolution, the Magistrates Act was amended in 
1996 to allow for changes in its composition and for the new Commission to be 
appointed for a period of three years, effective from 1 October 1998. The 
Commission was enlarged to twenty-seven members including a judge as the 
chairperson, the Minister of Justice (or his or her nominee), eight political 
representatives, four representatives of the practicing professions, two people 
involved with the training and education of lawyers and magistrates and five 'fit 
and proper persons'. The remaining six are representatives of the lower court 
judiciary. The Commission became more representative in terms of race and 
gender following these changes but with these changes, it also underwent a shift 
from having minimal links with the executive to once again being more executive 
driven. In effect the nomination provisions vest comprehensive control in the 
hands of the executive. The judge as chairperson, three of the magistrates and 
the five fit and proper persons are all chosen by the President. The Minister 











politicians are chosen by the National Assembly and the National Council of 
Provinces. Those from the National Assembly must include two opposition party 
members, whilst those from the National Council of Provinces require the support 
of six of the nine provinces (currently the choice of Commissioners rests with the 
majority party as all nine provinces are governed by the ANC). In 1998, when the 
new Magistrates Commission came into effect, the alterations to the basis of 
designation meant that the number of members designated by the executive in 
the Commission numbered 21 of the 27 members. 
This shift may have been a reactionary response to the apparent intentions of the 
Nationalist government in 1993, but it had implications for the perceived 
independence of the magistracy. The original selection of members of the 
Commission was largely in the hands of judicial officers or the legal profession (8 
of the 10 members), whilst control was now largely vested in the executive. It 
was also a shift even further away from the original proposals of the Hoexter and 
Law Commissions both of which had advocated for far more independent 
structures that were similar to that of the judges. Concerns about the relative 
institutional independence of the magistracy following the amendments to the 
composition of the Commission were raised in a number of fora despite a 
Constitutional Court ruling in 2002 confirming their institutional independence and 
debates continue on the topic. These are discussed further in Chapter Five. 
Linked to the implementation of the Magistrates Act was the implementation of 
the Regulations for Judicial Officers in Lower Courts Act of 1993 which came into 
force in March 1994. At the same time, attention was given to integrating the 
judiciary from the former homelands. Magistrates in the former homelands were 
placed under the Magistrates Act by Section 2(1) of the Judicial Matters 
Amendment Act 85 of 1995 in December 1995 which resulted in an 











The adoption of the Constitution in 1996 secured the independence of all the 
courts in a number of ways: section 165(2) states that the courts are independent 
and subject only to the Constitution and the law; section 165(4) places an 
obligation on organs of the state, through legislative and other measures, to 
assist and protect the courts to ensure their independence, impartiality, dignity, 
accessibility and effectiveness; and, finally, section 174(2) states that the 
judiciary needs to reflect broadly the racial and gender composition of South 
Africa and that this must be considered when appointing judicial officers. 
Despite these Constitutional principles, and although the newly constituted 
Magistrates Commission was more representative, a number of provisions within 
the Act and the Regulations still compromised judicial independence. Amongst 
these shortcomings were: 
(1) Section 10 allowed for the appointment of magistrates by the Minister of 
Justice who is a member of the executive 
(2) Section 12 allowed for the determination of salaries by the Minister after 
consultation with the Public Service Commission 
(3) Section 13(3) (a) (i) allowed the Minister to suspend magistrates for 
'misconduct'. The Act does not define misconduct in any detail, but 
Regulation 25 of the Regulations for Judicial Officers in Lower Courts 
defines this as including arriving late for work, being absent without leave 
or refusing to execute a lawful order. 
(4) Regulation 22 allowed for the Director General (a political appointee) to 
effect the transfer of magistrates with or without their consent. 
(Kgalema and Gready, 2000:4) 
In addition, there was no clear sense of to whom magistrates were accountable. 
Independence was needed to give the magistracy legitimacy, but with that, came 
the need for associated accountability measures. During apartheid as public 
servants, magistrates were accountable to the executive. The provisions of 
section 165(2) of the Constitution ("the courts are independent and subject only 











constitution's values and ethos but judicial performance also needs to be subject 
to certain other accountability mechanisms such as academic and public criticism 
which constrain their apparent freedom of action in the exercise of their power 
(Cameron, 1990: 253). Judicial officers are public figures and are accountable to 
the public. This sentiment is expressed by Constitutional Court Judge Kriegler in 
his judgement in S v Mamabolo (2001 (3) SA 409 (CC) at para 15): 
[it is] a constitutional imperative that public office-bearers such as judges 
[and magistrates] who wield great power. .. should be accountable to the 
public who appoint them and pay them. Indeed, if one takes into account 
that the judiciary, unlike the other two pillars of state are not elected and 
are not subject to dismissal if voters are unhappy with them, should not 
judges pre-eminently be subjected to continuous and searching public 
scrutiny and criticism? 
The need for accountability is even stronger in light of the magistracy's past 
closeness to the executive but by the mid-1990s there were no clear 
accountability mechanisms in place. 
3.3 Concluding remarks 
The 1993 Magistrates Act received a mixed response due to its evident political 
objectives at the time. Its critics believed it was implemented in order to ensure 
that the new government could not use magistrates to serve their own political 
ends in the same way that the apartheid government had done, rather than out of 
any real desire for independence. But these concerns aside, the groundwork had 
been laid for an independent magistracy. Real independence with a strong 
associated sense of accountability had not yet been achieved and it was not 
sufficient yet to signify that there was an accompanying commitment to the 
principles of independence and accountability. The TRC special legal hearings in 
1997 then came at a critical time in the judicial transformation process and 
created the space for the magistracy to demonstrate both their independence 












MAGISTRATES AND THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION 
4.1. Background to the TRC Special Legal Hearing 
In 1996 a human rights lawyer, Krish Govender, made a submission at a Victim 
Hearing of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). On the form, 
under "victim' he wrote "the South African people" and under "nature of 
violation', he wrote "injustice under the Apartheid judiciarY'. It was this 
submission that led to the inclusion of Special Legal Hearings in the South 
African TRC process (Dyzenhaus, 1998: 36). 
Although not mandated to investigate the systemic aspects of apartheid 
oppression in depth, but rather to focus on gross violations of human rights 
during the apartheid period from 1960 to 1993, the Commission was required 
by the TRC Act to get as complete a picture as possible of the social context in 
which the abuses took place (Preamble to the Promotion of National Unity and 
Reconciliation Act 31 of 1995). The TRC's Committee on Human Rights 
Violations organized special hearings addressing different sectors of society 
such as health, business and the media (Rombouts & Parmentier, 2002: 276). 
Broadly the hearings were aimed at getting answers to the following questions: 
How did so many people, working within so many influential sectors and 
institutions, react to what was happening around them? Did they know 
what was happening? If they did not know, or did not believe it was 
happening, from where did they derive their ignorance or their 
misunderstanding? Why is it only with hindsight that so many privileged 
members of society are able to see that what they lived through was a 
kind of madness and, for those at the receiving end of the system, a 
kind of hell? (TRC Report Vol 4, 1998: 1) 
The special Sectoral Hearings of the TRC were not intended to address 











political, economic and legal conditions that had made the atrocities possible, 
and through this to allow various institutions to account for their role in the past. 
At these hearings the TRC intended to evaluate institutional responsibilities for 
abuses and to identify the weaknesses within the structures or laws that should 
be changed to ensure that the past would not be repeated (Hayner, 2001: 29). By 
doing so, the space was created for institutional transformation to begin. 
The Special Legal Hearing was one of these hearings and took place on 27-29 
October 1997. Part of the TRC's intentions can be seen as wanting to re-instil in 
the nation a sense of confidence and belief in the state and its structures. For a 
judiciary to function properly, it must enjoy the confidence and trust of the 
community in which it operates. In the words of Kader Asmal, public confidence 
in the judiciary "reflects far reaching sentiments of belonging, identity and -
ultimately - of justice among us all" (foreword in Dyzenhaus, 1998: x) The 
judiciary's credibility had been severely damaged during the apartheid era and 
the Legal Hearings provided it with the opportunity to take responsibility and to 
account for its role during that time and so restore its relationship with society. 
Asmal (foreword in Dyzenhauz, 1998: ix) states "the apartheid judiciary has much 
responsibility to shoulder for the ills of the past - and could have done much to 
enlighten the country about the inner workings of apartheid's administrative 
labyrinth." However, as we shall see, the judiciary deliberately and notably failed 
to make use of this important opportunity to deal with its own complicity with 
apartheid. By failing to participate effectively in the TRC process, the judiciary 
failed to rise to the challenge of restoring and expanding public confidence. 
Prior to the oral hearings, the TRC sent out invitations to all branches of the legal 
profession as well as interested civil society groups inviting them to make written 
submissions on the role played by lawyers between 1960 and 1994. In the 
invitation, the Commission requested that attention be paid to twelve particular 











relationship between law and justice, the role of the judiciary in applying security 
legislation, the exercise of judicial discretion, attempts - if any - to undermine the 
independence of the judiciary, and racial and gender discrimination within the 
legal sector. Included was also a request for recommendations on how to 
transform the legal system to one that reflects a human rights culture and which 
would address the perception that justice is the domain of a privileged few in 
South African society (TRC Report Vol 4,1998: 93-94). 
The TRC also indicated that the most important submissions would be 
summarized orally during the hearing, and the presenters would have specific 
questions put to them. The idea was to create a different atmosphere from that at 
the victim or amnesty hearings - that it would be an environment in which 
representatives from different parts of the old order would come to present their 
views in a climate of enquiry that would not be confrontational (Oyzenhaus, 1998: 
28). The nature and objectives of the hearing were clearly stated: 
It is not the purpose of the hearing to establish guilt or hold individuals 
responsible; the hearing will not be of a judicial or quasi-judicial nature. 
The hearing is an attempt to understand the role the legal system played 
in contributing to the violation and/or protection of human rights and to 
identify institutional changes required to prevent those abuses which 
occurred from happening again. We urge all judges both serving and 
retired to present their views as part of the process of moving forward. 
(TRC report Vol 4, 1998: 95) 
4.2 The Judiciary's Response to the TRC Special Legal Hearing 
A wide range of organizations and individuals responded with written 
submissions to the TRC's invitation to participate in the Special Legal Hearing. 
The response of the judiciary was quite striking in that they almost all refused to 
participate in any meaningful way. Already in November 1996, before the 











on Krish Govender's presentation, made it clear that he was opposed to the 
process. The manner in which he expressed his comments reflected a basic 
misunderstanding of the stated purpose of the TRC Special Legal Hearing: 
In order to determine whether Judge X had allowed justice to be subverted 
in some alleged manner in a particular case, the TRC would in effect have 
to retry the case .... The mind boggles at what all this would involve. The 
impracticality of it all is manifest. 
(Corbett, 1998: 20) 
Chief Justice Corbett stated that he did not speak on behalf of the judiciary as a 
whole but that he had circulated the memorandum among the Appeal Court 
judges which "bears their endorsement" (Corbett, 1998: 17). His statement 
continued with an assessment of two particular cases9 that had been raised by 
Krish Govender and concluded that 'the broad picture [of the record of justice] 
is ... a favourable one' (Corbett, 1998: 18). 
But Corbett had created a tension in his argument that it was impractical to go 
into specific cases when he himself defended the judiciary in the two specific 
matters in his memorandum as well as by making a broad claim in defence of the 
general record of the courts; he undermined his own claim about the 
impracticality of such evaluation by evaluating the record himself, and moreover 
did so in a way intended to exonerate the role of the judiciary (Oyzenhaus, 1998: 
47). It was Corbett's memorandum that seemed to set the tone for the response 
of the judiciary as a whole to the invitation of the TRC and the tensions within the 
memorandum afflicted most of the other judicial submissions (Oyzenhaus, 1998: 
54). 
Specifically, the judges argued that they should not appear in person at the TRC 
hearing. The fundamental reason given for this was that they felt that their 
independence would be compromised if they had to account for their actions, and 
9 The first case was that of Andrew Zondo who was sentenced to death at the age of 20 for planting a limpet 












it would set a precedent for future commissions. (Boraine, 2000:184). This 
argument implied that the value of independence in the new democracy would 
suffer rather than benefit from any discussions at the TRC, suggesting that the 
record under apartheid had been one of independence (Oyzenhaus, 1998:137). 
Arguments against the judges' stance are best summed up in the words of 
Oyzenhaus: 
One cannot easily argue that judges' independence will be compromised 
by asking them to account for their conduct when they are called to 
account because of conduct which compromised their independence 
(Oyzenhaus, 1998: 54). 
The second argument for not attending the oral hearings was based on 
collegiality. The judges felt that the fragile relationship between 'old order' and 
'new order' judges would be severely damaged and this would affect the process 
of making the new order workable. The bench at that stage consisted of mostly 
conservative 'old order' judges, a number of 'liberal old order judges' as well as a 
few newly appointed judges. Collegiality in this context implied more than just 
getting along, but also of all judges committing themselves to the values of the 
new constitutional order (Oyzenhaus, 1998: 38). Both South Africa's most senior 
judges were distinguished human rights advocates. It was well known that most 
the old order judges still serving on the Supreme Court of Appeal had formally 
opposed the appointment (in 1997) of Mahomed (an Indian) as Chief Justice to 
the Supreme Court of Appeal. Neither Mahomed, nor the president of the 
Constitutional Court, Arthur Chaskalson, would have been offered an 
appointment under apartheid. And for either of them to criticise old order judges 
could have created enormous tensions and risked the rupture of the new 
collegiality (Oyzenhaus, 1998: 38-39). 
The judges' approach to the TRC hearings created the impression that they 
thought they were above the need for both truth and reconciliation and that there 











faculty at the University of Witwatersrand argued in her oral submission to the 
TRC, Parliament, when passing the TRC Act, had not exempted judges from the 
moral and legal duty to testify (Lewis, in Dyzenhaus, 1998: 47). By placing 
themselves above the law, judges created the impression that they were not 
accountable like any other member of society. 
4.3 The Magistrates Commission and the TRC Special Legal Hearing 
As extraordinary as the judges' refusal to appear in person, was the fact that 
magistrates simply did not participate in the TRC process in any significant way 
(except for one written submission prior to the hearing and two oral presentations 
at the hearing). The Magistrates Commission formally declined to participate 
because it could not decide whether participation in an investigation would be of 
any benefit as it was "without clarity" on the exact allegations, the identity of the 
accused and 'which section of the legal system is accused' (letter to TRC from 
Magistrates Commission 18/2/1997). 
Given the historical background discussed in the previous chapter, and in 
particular that magistrates had played such an important administrative role in 
implementing apartheid policy and had been accountable to the state, their 
presence at the hearing was crucial. At the actual hearing itself critics 
characterised the role of the magistracy as highly politicised, and much criticism 
was aimed at them in the hearings. (Gready and Kgalema, 2000: 2). For 
example, in his oral submission to the TRC Legal Hearing the human rights 
lawyer Lee Bozalek stated that: 
There is no doubt in my mind that there was a very serious political bias in 
the Magistrates Courts in the years past and this was evidenced to my 
mind by the relatively uncritical acceptance of police evidence with 
corresponding scepticism of the evidence given by the accused or his or 
her witnesses. My experience was in these cases that there was quite a 











very often relating to issues of credibility and in these cases this discretion 
was almost always exercised by the magistrate against the accused and 
in favour of the state (Bozalek oral submission to the TRC legal hearing). 
Other speakers also stressed the significant absence of the magistracy from the 
TRC's Legal Hearing: 
The big gap in today's proceedings has been the magistrates. They have 
been hearing hundreds of thousands of cases every year. Hundreds of 
thousand of people going to jail every year through the magistrates' courts 
and we haven't heard virtually a word (Professor McQuoid-Mason's oral 
submission to the TRC legal hearing). 
And similarly in the oral submission by NADEL: 
... What we mustn't lose sight of, however, is the fact that most of our 
people's experience of the justice system was predominantly at a lower 
court level. .. some of the basic and fundamental violations of the rule of 
law actually occurred at a magistrates' court level where people were 
denied their rights to legal representation ... where people were not treated 
with dignity ... they were the ones who prosecuted innumerable public 
violation offences ... (NADEL'S oral submission to the TRC legal hearing). 
How can the absence of the magistracy from a public hearing to which its role 
under apartheid was so central be explained? In the light of the letter from the 
Magistrates Commission already cited it is clear that the absence of the 
magistrates from the TRC's Special Legal Hearing was not incidental or a matter 
of oversight. Kgalema and Gready (2000: 9) suggest that the role of the 
Magistrates Commission in 'orchestrating the response or lack of response from 
the magistracy [to the TRC] is ... something that requires further investigation 
and clarification.' An attempt was made to gain clarity from the Magistrates 
Commission in this regard. A request was made for all documentation (minutes 
of meetings, letters etc) from that particular time period. It is the gaps in the 











have happened during that time. The following is a reconstructed summary of the 
relevant interaction between the TRC and the Magistrates Commission: 
• On 7 February 1997 the TRC sent a letter to the Magistrates Commission 
noting that a number of victims had made allegations questioning the role 
of and their treatment by, the legal system and requested suggestions for 
the format and content of the proposed special legal hearing. 
• On 18 February 1997 the Magistrates Commission responded that 
'without clarity on the following matters a decision whether participation in 
an investigation will be of any benefit cannot be reached'. The matters 
included which section of the legal system was accused, what the 
allegations were, and who were the accusers and what credibility did they 
have. This response already seems to indicate an unwillingness to 
participate - the TRC had not asked for opinion on whether it was 
appropriate for the hearings to take place or for the Magistrates 
Commission to decide to participate in the hearings, but rather they had 
asked for advice into how these hearings should take place. 
• On 21 August 1997 the TRC responded with another letter, 
acknowledging the letter of 18 February and stating that 'after giving 
consideration to your response and others received, the Legal Working 
Group of the TRC has decided to request submissions from a broad range 
of role players in the legal system ... ' It invited the Magistrates Commission 
to make a submission on the role of the magistracy at the Special Legal 
Hearings, and asked the Magistrates Commission to inform magistrates 
(both retired and serving) of the contents of the letter and to 'facilitate the 
making of submissions to the TRC.' 
• On 20 November 1997, after the Special Legal Hearings had been held in 
October, the TRC sent another letter again requesting submissions from 
the Magistrates Commission. This letter reiterated the purpose of the 
hearings and the broader TRC purpose and mandate 
• On 17 December 1997 the Magistrates Commission responded with a 











number of aspects but since the TRC did not reply to this request, this 
accounted for their own lack of further communication. In this letter the 
Magistrates Commission stated that they were prepared to assist the TRC 
by informing the cluster heads of the contents of the TRC's letters 
requesting further dissemination. It also stated that it had deputed a 
member to prepare recommendations on the transformation of the legal 
system. 
• On 4 February 1998 the TRC responded with a letter reminding the 
Magistrates Commission of its previous letter of 21 August 1997 (and 
reattaching it) and requested their report, noting that the deadline for the 
TRC report was 28 February 1998. 
• On 6 February 1998 the Magistrate's Commission responded stating that 
it was unlikely that their report would be ready before the deadline and 
that it had distributed the letter of 20 November 1997 to all magistrates 
• Finally, on 22 May 1998, a submission from the Magistrates Commission 
was sent, almost a full three months after the requested submission date. 
A covering letter stated that the Magistrates Commission had not received 
the letter of 21 August 1997 until the 4th February 1998. It stated further 
that it had 'not been unwilling to make a submission'. 
It is difficult to accept the stated justifications for the Magistrates Commission's 
belated submission to the TRC at face value. On reflection, it seems unlikely that 
the letter of 21 August 1997 was not received by the Magistrates Commission. It 
was both faxed and sent by registered mail. The apparent loss of this letter was 
not mentioned in the correspondence to the TRC dated 6 February 1998. Yet, in 
its submission on May 22 it is stated that the TRC's request had not been 
received until 4 February 1998. Nor is the Commission's excuse that the TRC 
had not responded to its queries asking for clarification convincing. Although the 
TRC had not responded directly to these queries, the letter of 21 August had 











content had in fact addressed a number of those concerns - most importantly 
emphasizing that the hearings were not about accusations or establishing guilt. 
It also seems peculiar that a request of this nature would not have been 
discussed at any meetings of the Commission prior to December 1997, given the 
importance and national media coverage of the TRC hearings and the public 
debate around the judiciary at that time. Extracts from the Commission's minutes 
during this time, as well as confirmation of this in an email from the current 
Secretary, indicate that the TRC matter was only discussed three times: on 11 
December 1997, 23 February 1998, and 21 May 199810. The extracts of the 
minutes refer only to the resolution that Professor Lourens du Plessis (a member 
of the Magistrates Commission) would draft the submission and that the TRC 
letter should be distributed to all magistrates. 
Professor du Plessis was asked in an email by the researcher what he 
remembered from around this time. He stated that he thought the TRC events 
had happened after his tenure on the Magistrates Commission. He did not 
remember that he had written the submission. His lack of memory of his role in 
the submission would appear to reflect the general lack of serious contemplation 
that the Magistrates Commission gave the Special Legal Hearings on the whole. 
The sequence of events, the gaps in the documentary records and what can only 
be seen as deliberate stalling tactics lead to the conclusion that the Magistrates 
Commission played a deliberate and significant role in ensuring that magistrates 
did not participate in the Special Legal Hearings of the TRC. Not one of the 
magistrates interviewed remember hearing about, or seeing, any letter sent from 
the Magistrates Commission informing them that they could make submissions. 
(The letter, if sent, would have gone to the Chief Magistrates and Cluster Heads 
10 Extracts from only two sets of minutes were received; item 17 of the minutes 11 December 1997 and item 
7 of the minutes 21 May 1998. When the researcher queried a reference to item 12.8 mentioned in the 
second extract (which implied another occasion that the TRC had been discussed) the secretary of the 
Commission responded that 'it had been mentioned again at a meeting on 23 February 1998'. No extracts or 
full copies of minutes of any meetings prior to 11 December 1997 were provided to the researcher, so no 











who then would have been expected to distribute its content to all magistrates in 
each office) When, as part of this research, the Magistrates Commission was 
itself asked for a copy of the letter that they claim to have sent, the response was 
that the Secretary could not find a copy in the files, but that he did remember that 
it was 'merely a short covering letter ... informing them that they are at liberty to 
submit submissions or representations directly to the office of the TRC' (email 
from the Secretary of the Magistrates Commission 20/10/2004). 
The submission eventually made by the Magistrates Commission to the TRC 
reflected a general unwillingness to take responsibility for the magistracy's role 
under apartheid, or to accept the need for accountability. It does, at first, 
acknowledge that 
'Magistrates were often called upon to actively participate in the execution 
of oppressive policies - both in their judicial and their administrative 
capacities. Many of them uncritically deferred to the policy of the 
government of the day, some probably with enthusiasm ... Apartheid was 
not just a 'system' but an all-pervading ideology that influenced the minds 
of people at all levels of society, including judicial officers" (Magistrates 
Commission written submission to the TRC, 1998: 3). 
However, the submission goes on to state that 'as civil servants ... [magistrates] 
were often required to execute controversial policies unquestioningly' (own 
emphasis) (Magistrates Commission, 1998: 3). This seems to imply that 
magistrates could not be expected to take responsibility for their actions as these 
were prescribed by government. This is supported later in the submission when 
its states 
[T]he Magistrates Commission is ready to learn from these failures in 
order to prevent a recurrence of governmental abuse of power (own 
emphasis) ascribable to the judicial malfunctioning of magistrates.' 
(Magistrates Commission, 1998: 4) 
The implication appears to be that abuses under apartheid were the 











The submission, in its brief four-page entirety, did not move from its brief moment 
of acknowledgement to one of apology. It avoided making any statement that 
would require magistrates to be accountable and focused instead on the 
Magistrates Commission's role in transformation as that of 'inculcating a decided 
sense of independence with magistrates'. The Commission further defined its 
role as 'a watchdog jealously guarding the independence of the magistracy' 
(Magistrates Commission, 1998: 4). 
The submission concluded that it 'looks forward to the report of the TRC because 
that would help it assess the judiciary's failures of the past' (Magistrates 
Commission. 1998: 4). In the circumstances this assurance can hardly be taken 
seriously. In effect the Magistrates Commission had significantly contributed to 
the fact that magistrates did not participate in the hearings in any meaningful 
way. By submitting its views late to the TRC, the Commission also avoided any 
real public engagement with the issues surrounding the role of the magistracy 
during apartheid. 
4.4 Magistrates' Perceptions of the TRC Special Legal Hearing 
It is against this background that the almost complete absence of magistrates 
from the TRC's Special Legal Hearing should be considered. Apart from the lack 
of encouragement by the Magistrates Commission, the magistrates interviewed 
also claimed that at the time of the TRC there was a climate of fear and 
intimidation in the magistracy and that they did nothing without approval from 
their superiors. In Chapter 3 we suggested that the Magistrates Commission 
members had signaled that in essence there should be 'no change', and it seems 
magistrates, either willingly or not, complied with this instruction. 
Magistrate 'Lombard' stated that 'you wouldn't dare to step out of the 











(Interviews with 'Lombard' and 'Smith'). In his interview magistrate 'De Wet' 
corroborated these sentiments: 
'If the circular had come, and if the wording was such that it was easy for 
me to go, I would have gone. Definitely. I would have voiced my concerns. 
But, on the other side, I was filled with fear. You know with the powers up 
there [Pretoria], I never knew how strong they were ... So I didn't go 
because I was very afraid .... 1 had responsibilities towards my wife and my 
children .... There was talk amongst the colleagues that if you open your 
mouth you're going to get sent out somewhere in the Transkei or the 
Ciskei where you will be the only white' (Interview with magistrate 'de 
Wet'). 
Significantly some of the black magistrates also recalled an atmosphere of 
reluctance and constraint at the time of the TRC hearing. Magistrate 'Dlamini' 
stated that 
I remember an immediate reluctance from the magistracy to get involved 
- suddenly 'judicial independence' became an issue and there was 
tangible resistance. The people in charge were the same people who were 
involved in some of the issues that were the TRC issues [those about 
actively supporting or participating in human rights abuses] so it was not a 
question of personally deciding not to go .... It was about toeing the line .... 
We didn't have the authority to do that (interview with magistrate 
'Dlamini'). 
These statements present an interesting insight in magistrates' engagement with 
their past and the ongoing transformation of the magistracy. It was, after all by 
1997/1998 some 5 years since the necessary legislative changes had been 
implemented to remove magistrates from the public service; and the Magistrates 
Commission had been established in 1993 (albeit with a conservative 
composition at first). Ostensibly then, as independent judicial officers, there was 
no need to fear the reactions from 'Pretoria'. It may well be that particular 











positions of authority within the magistracy, but the structural changes which had 
been made at least in principle gave magistrates the 'authority' to participate free 
from the influence of the Department of Justice. 
These comments suggest that, rather than only fear of reprisal from the 
'authorities', it was to some extent instead magistrates' own unwillingness to 
accept any sense of responsibility or accountability that drove their personal 
decisions not to participate in the TRC. As magistrate 'Smith' said 'you weren't 
going to stick your neck out' (Interview with magistrate 'Smith') - it was easier to 
maintain the status quo amongst one's colleagues and remain passive than to 
engage publicly with the TRC and take on responsibility for the wrongs of the 
past. 
The only attempt by magistrates as a group to participate in the hearings was 
through a submission made by the Judicial Officers Association of South Africa 
(JOASA) on behalf of its members. This submission was dated 2 September 
1998. Its lateness could be attributed to the delays of the Magistrates 
Commission's own submission and associated delay in alerting magistrates that 
they could make submissions. On the other hand, it could also indicate an 
unwillingness to engage with any confrontations and questions that might have 
been raised at the forum of the TRC. 
Magistrates' retrospective memories in this regard raise some interesting points 
around the possible suppression of the facts in order to save face and individual 
credibility but are selective and self-serving. The then president of JOASA 
described the process around the submission as follows (including the emphasis 
on the race of individuals): two magistrates (one black and one white) had been 
mandated to write the submission while the document was signed by the then 
President of JOASA (who is also black). The submission was handed to the then 
secretary of JOASA (who is white). The president of JOASA went overseas 











submitted 'late' and that 'although the document finally reached the TRC it 'didn't 
receive the attention it deserved' and that the 'late' submission was deliberate 
(fax to the researcher from magistrate 'Mapoi' 24/2/2005). This version of events 
was confirmed in a telephone conversation with the black author of the 
submission. Implicit in this statement is a suggestion that it was the old order 
white magistrates who were unwilling to participate in the TRC hearings. It may 
be that all of these events did in fact take place, but the emphasis placed on the 
possible racial undertones in the sequence of events, the apparent 'lateness' of 
the submission and its role in 'deliberately defeating its cause', is misleading in 
its claim. 
This aside, the JOASA submission noted that 'magistrates were instruments 
wielded by the authorities in pursuit of apartheid motivated ends' (JOASA 
submission, 1998 :2). Unlike the Magistrates Commission, they apologized 
'unreservedly' for both 'conscious and unconscious acts and omissions by 
judicial officers at the district level that could have the effect of undermining 
human rights from time to time' (JOASA submission, 1998: 3). The submission 
also acknowledged that magistrates were 'influenced by the poliCies of the 
government of the day' and that what took place in the past could only have 
happened in a situation of 'a dire lack of judicial independence' (JOASA 
submission, 1998: 9). It highlighted particular failures such as the treatment of 
black people when magistrates implemented pass laws and the like; the 
magistracy's failure in dealing with detainees, forced confessions and deaths in 
detention appropriately; and their inappropriate association with politicians, 
secret and other societies with political leanings and the security forces (JOASA 
submission, 1998: 6-7). The submission also noted some areas of success: that 
some magistrates did report abuses of detainees; that they adhered to the rule of 
law in 'a number of instances'; some applied the law 'free of bias and prejudice' 











The JOASA submission indicated the first real acknowledgement by the 
magistracy of its role in the past as well as its complete lack of judicial 
independence. It also confirmed some of the experiences mentioned at the TRC 
hearings by those who presented oral testimony. It is profoundly unfortunate that 
its submission almost one year after the legal hearings detracted almost entirely 
from its potential impact. The submission could have played a significant role in 
instilling public confidence in the institution through its relatively honest appraisal 
of its role under apartheid as well as created a platform for magistrates to start 
grappling with the issues of independence and accountability. 
In contrast, magistrates' own reasons for not attending the TRC hearings reflect 
a disturbing tendency to absolve themselves from any personal complicity or 
culpability with regards to the apartheid system that they had worked in: "I didn't 
feel I had anything to air as a magistrate' (Magistrate 'Brown'), 'there was no 
need to attend personally' (Magistrate 'Mandla'), 'Yes they ... the white 
magistrates should have gone' (Magistrate 'Ndlovu' ) and there was' ... no need 
to attend, it had all worked out well for me' (Magistrate 'Groen'). 
Magistrate 'Brown's response is also interesting in its reflections of her personal 
justifications for not having to feel responsible for the past. Throughout her 
interview she asserted that at no stage had she felt that she was not 
independent: 'my daily experience was one of functioning without fear, without a 
sign of executive control'. Though we can accept the subjective veracity of her 
views, her comments raise various troubling questions. Firstly, given the 
institutional location of the magistracy under the executive controls of the 
apartheid state, it is not clear to what extent she could have functioned 
independently as a magistrate at the time. Secondly, this must raise the question 
of possible "denialism" on her part, i.e. that she either does not recognize or 
alternatively suppresses her complicity as a magistrate with the apartheid 
system. She was (and is) a member of an institution that has been generally 











complicit with the upholding of the apartheid system. Her comment reflects the 
general avoidance within the magistracy of facing up to their institutional 
accountability. 
As we have seen in Chapter 3 the evidence is that on the whole magistrates 
under apartheid were politically compliant, content with applying government 
policy unquestioningly. However, the magistrates interviewed typically justified 
what they did by creating a moral divide between their own daily work and that of 
the 'political magistrates' (i.e. the regional court magistrates), thus absolving 
themselves of culpability as they did not see their work as overtly political. 
Generally, magistrates' reasons for not attending the TRC hearing echo 
Magistrate 'de Kock's statement of 
'[there was] nothing we could have done .... That was the law. We couldn't 
have influenced anything .... 1 was part of the system .... 1 could have lost 
my job' (Interview with magistrate 'de Kock'). 
Another reason for non-attendance was a similar explanation to that given by the 
judges of 'the need to foster congeniality'. JOASA had only recently been formed 
and had elected a black magistrate as its first president. Magistrate 'Mapoi' 
states that he thought it would not have been a good idea to attend 'since we 
were busy with reconciliation amongst ourselves' (Interview with Magistrate 
'Mapoi'). It is not clear how this process of internal 'reconciliation' would have 
been threatened by participation in the TRC hearing whose general objective 
was precisely to support and facilitate transformation of this kind. 
Magistrate 'Dyosi' seems to be the only magistrate interviewed who grappled 
with the moral and political implications of her actions. Her reflections seem to 
voice some of the real reasons for non-attendance by the magistracy 
At first I thought, no: this is for the white magistrates, I haven't done 
anything. Then I realized that I was using the white magistrates as a 











realized that I wanted to exonerate myself because I had done enough 
damage by working in the apartheid state and not for my people and there 
was nothing worth mentioning. For my own selfish reasons I didn't want to 
expose myself to scrutiny and have people maybe say to me that I was a 
sell-out (Interview with Magistrate 'Dyosi'). 
We must conclude that magistrates are indeed to a large degree themselves 
responsible for not engaging with the TRC. But they cannot be expected to 
shoulder all the blame. The TRC also has to accept some level of responsibility 
for the failure of the magistracy to attend the hearings. In this connection the 
question must be raised as to why the TRC chose going via the Magistrates 
Commission as the route to seek the participation of magistrates at the Special 
Legal Hearings. One of the co-ordinators of the TRC Legal Hearings, Ms Melanie 
Lue-Dugmore, stated in an interview with the researcher that they were 
instructed by the TRC commissioners to follow protocol and thus to approach the 
magistrates through the relevant statutory body. However, it was well-known at 
this time that the Magistrates Commission as then constituted was a 
controversial body whose membership was almost completely white and 
conservative. At some level it should have been obvious that it was unlikely that 
the Magistrates Commission would encourage the magistrates to attend. In its 
responses to the TRC the Magistrates Commission had actually made its own 
unco-operative stance clear. Moreover, almost all Chief Magistrates and Heads 
of Office were conservative white Afrikaner men who were unlikely to encourage 
attendance of the magistrates falling under their leadership. In the circumstances 
the TRC would have done better to explore other avenues for engaging the 
magistracy in the Legal Hearing than just following the route dictated by 
bureaucratic protocol. 
The fact of the matter is that at the time the TRC Legal Hearing had become a 
highly contested matter within legal and judicial circles. The response of the 











outcries aimed at the judiciary and there were calls for subpoenas to be issued 
on the judges, forcing them to participate in the TRC Hearing. The TRC 
discussed this at length and eventually decided not to do so (Boraine, 2000:186). 
The result of all of this was that the tone of the hearings became quite 
adversarial with the TRC Chairperson, Bishop Tutu, even attacking the judiciary 
in his opening address (Oyzenhaus, 1998:30). In short, the climate that had been 
created around the hearings was not conducive to encouraging participation from 
a reluctant magistracy. 
In its findings the TRC stated 
The Commission deplores and regrets the almost complete failure of the 
magistracy to respond to the Commission's invitation, the more so 
considering the previous lack of formal independence of magistrates and 
their dismal record as servants of the apartheid state in the past. They and 
the country lost an opportunity to examine their role in the transition from 
oppression to democracy (TRC report Vol 4, 1998: 108). 
This assessment of the lost opportunity is surely correct. Notwithstanding the 
various factors contributing to the magistrates' lack of participation in the TRC 
process, it is indeed disappointing that magistrates did not make better use of the 
opportunity to engage with their past and to contribute to the process of 
transformation. The Special Legal Hearings came at a critical moment in the 
transformation of the magistracy. Instead of using the formalistic 'lack of 
authority' argument (see above, pages 64-65) to explain their non-attendance, it 
could have been an instructive and important opportunity for magistrates to have 
asserted their newfound independence in the eyes of the public. In the words of 
Gready and Kgalema (2000: 14): 
It is not possible to embrace transformation, including the idea of 
independence, without acknowledgment and accountability. This will 
require institutional leadership and individual reflection. Given this 
inauspicious beginning, it remains to be seen how the profession will 











4.5 Concluding remarks 
With the benefit of hindsight, some of the magistrates interviewed acknowledged 
the lost opportunity presented by their non-attendance at the TRC hearings: 
We do need a structure to deal with the kinds of problems the TRC tried to 
do ... In simple terms: the judiciary has not been unaffected by apartheid 
and is still carrying baggage from that era and if it is not properly treated 
we will have some kind of a situation as a result (Interview with Magistrate 
'Dlamini'). 
One would be na"ive to say that there is no need for such a commission 
[as the TRC] (Interview with Magistrate 'Mandla'). 
Magistrate 'Mapoi' even suggested that the original JOASA submission should 
be scrutinized as part of a process of dealing with the past 
I have decided that with the renewed concerns on racism within the 
judiciary, the document must reemerge and be submitted to both the Chief 
Justice and the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 
(Interview with Magistrate 'Mapoi') 
It is unclear how the majority of magistrates engaged with, or even 
acknowledged the contents of this submission at its time of writing. More 
important than scrutiny by the Chief Justice or Minister, would be magistrates 
own active engagement with the content of the document. The comments above 
though, seem to express that the need for 'dealing with the past' is based more 
on concerns about residual racism rather than concerns about the structural 
transformation of the magistracy as an institution. As much as attitudinal 
concerns are an important part of the transformation process, in Chapter 3 we 
saw that there were still a number of outstanding institutional issues in securing 












PROFESSIONALISATION AND INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION 
The approach in this thesis has been broadly historical, following developments 
affecting the magistracy from the apartheid era to the beginning of new 
democratic dispensation with special attention paid to the (missed) opportunity 
offered by the TRC Legal Hearings. However, that history is ongoing and needs 
to be updated with reference to more recent developments like the strategic 
policy document, Justice Vision 2000; notable court cases such as Van Rooyen 
(2001) and the introduction of a National Quality Assurance Division by the 
Magistrates Commission. In part this chapter is concerned with an updating of 
these recent developments. However, this is not merely a descriptive history of 
the development of the magistracy. In practice the institutional transformation of 
the magistracy presents a complex challenge because, even as the institution 
requires statutory separation from the executive and public service, the 
magistracy paradoxically requires the Department of Justice's policies to guide 
this process. But this does not mean that the policies and interventions of the 
Justice Department provide the criteria against which such transformation is to 
be assessed (otherwise whatever the Department decrees or does will determine 
what counts as "transformation'). As a study of the transformation of the 
magistracy a more holistic understanding of the overall process is required. This 
is attempted with reference to two broad perspectives: i) the development of 
international standards for the independence of the judiciary which provide a set 
of relevant benchmarks and criteria for assessing the ongoing transformation of 
the judiciary and magistracy in South Africa, and ii) the broad social process of 
professionalisation as applied to the particular case of the magistracy. 
A number of key international documents describes the essential elements of 
judicial independence. These include the United Nations Basic Principles on the 
Independence of the Judiciary which were endorsed by the General Assembly in 











by the International Commission of Jurists in May 1981; the Universal Charter of 
the Judge prepared by the International Association of Judges in 1999; and more 
recently, the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct drawn up by the Judicial 
Integrity Group in 2001 and endorsed by the United Nations Commission on 
Human Rights in 2003. The second part of this chapter will begin with a brief 
review of these international standards for judicial independence, as well as 
challenges to the magistracy's institutional independence in court cases such as 
Van Rooyen (2001), and discuss the implications for the transformation of the 
magistracy in South Africa. 
The ongoing changes to the magistracy described in previous chapters, 
particularly their removal from the public service and their improved security of 
tenure, are also characteristic of the general process of increased 
professionalisation. Other changes typically associated with professionalisation 
include: specialized skills and training, a minimum salary, the formation of 
professional associations and the development of a code of ethics to govern the 
professional practice (Carr-Saunders, 1966:2). In addition, a concept central to 
professionalisation is that the professional 'proceeds by his own judgment and 
authority; he thus enjoys "autonomy" restrained by responsibility' (Moore, 
1970:6). This 'autonomy' for the magistracy is expressed as judicial 
independence. As Moore articulates, autonomy needs to be balanced with 
responsibility, which implies an associated need for appropriate accountability 
structures. The transformation of the magistracy may thus be considered in 
terms of the institutional changes needed to entrench the magistracy's 
independence and support their continuing professionalisation. The final part of 
this chapter will focus on these issues. There is a wide range of such issues 
relevant to the institutional transformation of the magistracy including their 
relationship with the community and the transformation of mindsets and 
organizational culture. For the purposes of this research, the final section of this 











accountability within the framework of increased professionalisation of the 
magistracy. 
5.1 Ongoing developments in the transformation of the magistracy 
During the first decade of the new South African democracy after 1994 various 
policy positions were announced and institutional changes introduced with regard 
to the magistracy. We will briefly review some of the main developments in this 
process including measures to consolidate the independence of the magistracy 
and to revise the functions of the inspectorate division. 
5.1.1 Justice Vision 2000: Consolidating the Independence of the 
Magistracy 
Following the initial restructuring of the magistracy, which actually started before 
the 1994 under the NP government, the Department of Justice (DOJ) identified a 
number of concerns about the independence of the magistracy. These were 
outlined in Justice Vision 2000, the strategic policy document for 1997-2000. The 
concerns listed included the need to 'consolidate the actual independence from 
the DOJ for lower court judicial officers; and [to] review conditions of work for 
magistrates to strengthen their independence' (Department of Justice, 1997:38). 
The strategy outlined in Justice Vision 2000 included proposals for removing the 
numerous administrative functions from magistrates. 
Subsequently the Department has had some success with relieving magistrates 
of their administrative duties through a number of strategies. One of these 
involved the introduction of the "cluster system" which actually dates back to the 
Magistrates Amendment Act 66 of 1998. Section 2 of that Act allowed for the 
establishment of a new court management system which included the "cluster 
system." Magistrates Courts in the nine provinces are structured into fourteen 











specific cluster, while senior magistrates are in control of a number of magisterial 
districts on the sub-regional level (Opening address by Dullah Omar, Minister of 
Justice, 1998). 
The cluster system was developed in response to the fact that the removal of 
Magistrates from the public service meant that the Director-General and the 
Minister of Justice could no longer give direct instructions to magistrates. The 
system is based on the idea that control should be exercised over magistrates by 
magistrates themselves. The cluster system also aims to separate administration 
and prosecution from the judicial functions of the magistracy (Opening address 
by Dullah Omar, Minister of Justice, 1998). 
More recently, this model has included the reallocation of all non-judicial 
administrative functions traditionally exercised by chief and senior magistrates to 
court managers. It intends to do away with the need for the current regional 
offices-based model, devolving administrative decision making to the court level 
in order to reduce response times and improve the efficiency of the court system. 
In principle this would allow the leadership in the courts to focus on legal 
questions and judicial functions and also to provide professional guidance to new 
entrants to the judiciary (Department of Justice, 2004 re aga boswa brochure). 
5.1.2 Review of inspectoral scrutiny 
In Chapter Three we discussed some of the problems relating to the traditional 
role of the Inspectorate Division. The inspectorate division's role of enforcing the 
compliance of magistrates with department policy became increasingly 
problematic in an environment in which magistrates were supposed to be 
independent from the Department of Justice. The Department itself raised this 
problem in Justice Vision 2000, and accepted that the inspectorate's role and 
function needed to be reconsidered to ensure independence of the magistracy 











The changes to the inspectorate division came about over the same period as 
the cluster system was developed. Although the inspectorate is now generally 
called the 'Quality Assurance Division', the name change has not been 
legislated, but came about 'a long time ago after discussions with the Minister in 
about 1994'. The change was 'minuted at meetings around 1997 and approved 
by the Magistrates' Commission and the Minister. 11 (Telephonic interview with 
Mr. Chris Barnard, Head of the Quality Assurance Division 14/9/2005). At this 
stage the renamed inspectorate, now as the 'Quality Assurance Division', was 
still located within the DOJ. The Minister at that time indicated that the change in 
function should be implemented with immediate effect i.e. that the Quality 
Assurance Division should no longer do administrative inspections on behalf of 
the DOJ, but only judicial inspections. Due to a lack of resources and skills, the 
Department requested that the judicial officers (quality assurors) continue to 
assist the Department until the Department had built sufficient internal 
administrative capacity. Thus in practice a designated set of quality assurance 
magistrates were to continue with both administrative and judicial inspections 
(memorandum from Secretary of the Magistrates Commission 3/11/2005). 
In 2003, the Magistrates Commission requested that the Department allow for 
management and control of quality assurance magistrates to be taken over by 
Judicial Heads in the various administrative regions. But there was still 
insufficient capacity within the Department to perform administrative quality 
assessments and the Minister decided that Quality Assurance magistrates would 
continue to report to the Department in relation to their administrative work and 
report to their respective Cluster Heads for their judicial work (memorandum 
from Secretary of the Magistrates Commission 3/11/2005). Only in April 2004 
was the National Division of the Quality Assurance Division relocated to the 
Magistrates Commission and at the same time, the Department took over the 
11 It is interesting to note that when phoning the Department of Justice in order to locate the phone number 
of the 'quality assurance division' all personnel that the researcher spoke to (from the central switchboard 
through to general departmental personnel) still referred to it as the Inspectorate, some 8 years after the 











administrative quality assurance function (memorandum from Secretary of the 
Magistrates Commission 3/11/2005). It is clear then that until very recently, 
incumbents to these posts, who are in fact magistrates, continued to perform 
work for the Department of Justice. Their functions include a minimum of 500 
court hours (in order to keep up to date with judicial work ), caseflow and court 
management, training, disciplinary investigations and trials; and should not 
include work for the Department of Justice, as is the case with any other 
magistrate. Their continued close working relationship with the Department for 
some ten years after the implementation of the Magistrates Act 1993 is 
problematic, with serious implications for perceptions of their independence 
affecting confidence from within the magistracy. 
It is therefore not surprising that more than half of the magistrates interviewed 
indicated various levels of distrust in the incumbents and suspicions of the 
intentions of the 'quality assurance' division, especially with regard to the process 
around the establishment of the National Division and the selection of the 
incumbents to their posts. A number of magistrates mentioned these 
appointments as an impediment to transformation of the magistracy as the 
incumbents appear to have been appointed without much transparency. Many 
voiced concerns that it was 'a job creation exercise for the people from the old 
inspectorate' (Magistrate 'Brown' 10/11/2005). As 'Brown' articulates further: 
I am concerned that the Magistrates Commission seems to be allowing 
itself to be controlled by persons who were formerly very much a part of 
the executive of the previous government. These people will serve any 
master to achieve their own ends. They strike fear into the hearts of some 
magistrates because of their past behaviour. They know little about 
independence and I fear have even less respect for it. 
The researcher requested clarity on the appointment process from the Quality 











The erstwhile Inspectorate Division consisted of judicial as well as 
administrative posts. With the separation of the judicial and administrative 
functions a number of legally qualified officials were retained at National 
level in Judicial Quality Assurance posts while in each of the thirteen 
Judicial Administrative Regions posts of Regional Judicial Quality 
Assurance officers were created. At the time of separation of functions 
the Inspectorate functioned in a number of Judicial Administrative 
Regions. The Judicial Quality Assurance magistrates serving at National 
level and Regional Divisions were retained while in three instances, Free 
State-Welkom, Mpumalanga-Nelspruit and KwaZulu/Natal-
Pietermaritzburg the posts were advertised and filled in the normal course 
of events 
(email from Jan Saaiman, National Quality Assurance Division 5/12/2006). 
Magistrates' concerns about the establishment of the Quality Assurance Division 
being a 'job creation exercise for the old Inspectorate' seem justified as, except 
for the three new posts that were created, all the posts are filled by ex-
Inspectors. 
An actual clear divide between the respective roles of the Department and of the 
Magistrates Commission in 'inspectoral scrutiny' still does not seem well-
established despite the separation of these functions in 2004. A memorandum 
emailed to the researcher from the Secretary of the Commission on 3/11/2005, 
states 
The Commission and Cluster Heads agree that the judicial quality 
assurance officers could still assist the Department if requested and when 
it is viable. The Judicial Quality Assurance Component is committed to 
assist the Department wherever circumstances so require. 
This comment is disturbing in its implications for independence. Quality assurors 
are magistrates and as part of their function are required to perform magisterial 
duties in court. They should not be performing duties for the Department of 











The issues raised by magistrates interviewed about the Quality Assurance 
Division also relate to the concept of internal or individual independence. This 
requires magistrates to be free from the influence of colleagues including that of 
both their horizontal and vertical "bosses" (Dung, 2003:11). This does not 
preclude magistrates from sharing the facts of cases and discussing relevant 
legal issues with colleagues, but does require the process to be a consultation 
rather than an authoritarian instruction (Dung, 2003:12). The historical 
functioning of the Inspectorate was one of authoritarian state controlled 
instruction, and from the personal accounts in Chapter 3, it seems that the 
incumbents were dedicated implementers of such authority. It is not surprising, 
then, that magistrates still articulated a strong sense of distrust in the 
Inspectorate under its new guise of the Quality Assurance Division. 
Perhaps the Magistrates Commission could have communicated the revised role 
and function of the Quality Assurance Division in a manner which reflected a 
better understanding of the problems with the historical role of the former 
Inspectorate as well as presenting a strategy to combat the perceptions of 
distrust at the time of the changes. The comments from the magistrates 
interviewed seem to indicate an overall lack of confidence in the Magistrates 
Commission resulting in a lack of trust in its initiatives. The Magistrates 
Commission should be questioning the effects on independence of the 
relationship of the Quality Assurance Division with the Department, not 
encouraging a continued working relationship as suggested in the memorandum. 
On the other hand, there also needs to be a greater acknowledgment of their 
own roles in the past by the magistrates interviewed themselves. Although the 
concerns raised in the interviews may be valid in terms of their distrust of 
particular individuals in the posts as well as the reasons for the creation of the 
Quality Assurance Division, their concerns fail to acknowledge that they too, for 











Inspectorate whom they distrust. Many South Africans distrusted and feared the 
magistrates in the old dispensation yet magistrates seem to absolve themselves 
from their own culpability in 'the past' or of any need for them, too, to be held 
accountable in that regard. 
In short, although there is nothing intrinsically wrong with the establishment of an 
internal accountability mechanism within the magistracy, there is a problem when 
this mechanism, through the nature and history of incumbents selected for the 
posts, is regarded with suspicion and distrust by the very people who are meant 
to account to such a structure. In addition, there was no dialogue and collective 
understanding or belief as to how the roles of those incumbents will be changed. 
It would have served the magistracy well to have discussed this particular issue 
at the TRC had they attended. 
5.2 International standards of judicial independence 
We have noted that in recent years a number of international declarations have 
articulated the essential elements of judicial independence, and that these may 
serve to provide a set of relevant benchmarks and criteria for assessing the 
ongoing transformation of the judiciary and magistracy in SA. The key elements 
of judicial independence highlighted in these international declarations include 
the following: 
• An essential element of judicial independence is that of external 
independence which implies that the judiciary must be free from any 
external influence and control (including that by the executive and 
legislative branches of government) and free to determine matters 
impartially, on the basis of fact and in accordance with law (United Nations 











• Another aspect of judicial independence is that of internal independence 
which requires independence from judicial colleagues including chief 
magistrates and the Chief Justice ( Section 1 (4) of the Bangalore 
Principles of Judicial Conduct 2001). 
• Equally important for the effective functioning of judicial independence is 
the need for security of tenure and remuneration, protection from arbitrary 
transfer and that judicial officers should enjoy personal immunity from civil 
suits for monetary damages for improper acts or omissions in the exercise 
of their judicial functions. (United Nations Basic Principles on the 
Independence of the Judiciary, 1985). 
We will return to a closer consideration of the relevance and implications of these 
different elements of judicial independence for the South African magistracy 
below. But first we must consider a more general challenge to the institutional 
independence arising from a key court case. 
5.2.1 Challenges to institutional independence 
The constitutional requirement that the courts are institutionally independent and 
impartial was challenged specifically in relation to the magistrates courts in 2001 
in Van Rooyen and Others v S and Others 2002 (8) BCLR 810 (CC). This case 
provides an illuminating perspective on the complex process of consolidating the 
magistracy's independence from the Department of Justice. 
In 2001, a full bench of the Transvaal Provincial Division of the High Court found 
that the regional court did not function as an institutionally independent and 
impartial court of law, due to the degree in which magistrates were regulated by 
the Department of Justice, by the office of the Attorney-General and still 
functioned as part of the civil service generally (Van Rooyen, 2002: 811). The 











section 165 of the Constitution because it lacked the independence required 
(Van Rooyen, 2002:811). On these grounds the Court found a number of 
sections of the Magistrates Court Act and Magistrates Act unconstitutional and 
invalid. The case was then referred to the Constitutional Court and required them 
to consider the question of the institutional independence and constitutional 
legitimacy of the lower courts in the light of the statutory provisions applicable to 
magistrates (Van Rooyen, 2002:811). Although the Constitutional Court found 
the magistracy to be sufficiently independent, subsequent analyses of the 
judgment, gave rise to further debates which suggest that the issue has not been 
resolved. 
Thus Franco and Powell (2004:576) conclude that whilst the magistracy may be 
statutorily independent, it still lacks institutional independence. They argue, 
firstly, that there is an overlap between the branches of government in that 
magistrates still carry out administrative functions. This has implications for 
independence as it creates a closer relationship with the executive than that of 
the higher courts. Secondly, in support of the original High Court decision, they 
argue that the Magistrates Commission cannot fulfill its function of guarding the 
independence of the magistracy unless it itself has the power and authority to 
make and carry out independent decisions (Franco and Powell, 2004:568). In its 
judgment, the High Court had concluded that the Magistrates Commission is an 
executive structure and that 'to all intents and purposes the Magistrates 
Commission is an organ of State' and therefore lacked institutional independence 
(Van Rooyen, 2002:823, at para 36E-F) This argument is based on the increased 
say of the legislature and executive in the composition of the Magistrates 
Commission since the 1996 changes to the Commission. Although the 
Constitutional Court found this not to be problematic, combined with the wide 
discretionary powers of the Minister these factors do seem to limit the 











On closer consideration the decisive factor affecting the independence of the 
magistracy is that of the Minister of Justice's wide discretionary powers, more 
particularly in relation to the Magistrates Commission. As mentioned in Chapter 
3, the Minister has sole discretion in approval of early retirement, and the 
creation of a complaints procedure by the public. In matters concerning 
appointment, extension of tenure, promotion, general conditions of service and 
assigning of administrative powers, the Minister acts 'after consultation with' or 
'on recommendation of' the Magistrates Commission, but retains the power not to 
follow the advice of the Magistrates Commission (Franco and Powell, 2004: 578). 
And it seems that in practice this power is indeed used at times to override the 
advice of the Commission. The Commission notes this as a concern in its 2001 
report on the rationalization process of the courts: 
The empowering provisions of the Magistrates Act, 1993 only allow the 
Commission to make recommendation, to advise or to report in regard to 
certain specified matters. It does not have the power to give direction to 
anyone. A number of previous recommendations by the Commission have 
not been implemented whilst others appear to have been simply ignored 
(Magistrates Com mission, 2001 : 1 0). 
From this it appears that the concerns of Franco and Powell, as well as those of 
the High Court, regarding the lack of judicial independence of the magistracy are 
by no means theoretical only. 
In its 2001 report the Magistrates Commission also raised other concerns about 
the relationship between the Department and the magistracy. Inter alia it stated 
that 'it is difficult to conceive how the courts could be perceived as being 
independent of the executive when they appear in the hierarchical structure of 
the Department of Justice's organogram' (Magistrates Commission,2001 :4). 
The report recommended that the entire judiciary Uudges and magistrates) 
should be structured as 'a separate institution with its own manifest identity'. 











Commission should operate independently from the Department, that timeframes 
for ministerial contemplation of recommendations from the Commission should 
be stipulated by law, and that grounds for any rejection of recommendations 
should be set out, i.e. that the Minster should be required to provide written 
reasons for rejecting any recommendations (Magistrates Commission, 2001: 14). 
Although the courts have subsequently been removed from the Department's 
organogram, none of the other major issues raised in the Magistrates 
Commission's report or by Franco and Powell have so far been addressed. In an 
email from the Secretary of the Commission, in which he responds to the 
researcher on a query abut the status of these issues, he states that 'there have 
been no further developments regarding any of the matters raised in your 
message. We assume that all these matters will be considered when the 
Department begins with the consultation process which we assume will start next 
year' (email from the Secretary of the Magistrates Commission 4/12/2006). 
5.2.2 Distinct elements of judicial independence 
We now consider the distinct elements identified above at the beginning of this 
sub-section 5.2 with reference to the international declarations of standards for 
judicial independence. 
5.2.2.1 Protection from arbitrary transfer 
The matter of transfer of magistrates is dealt with in regulation 22 of the 
Regulations for Judicial Officer in the Lower Courts, 1993, which states: 
22. (1) A magistrate may-
(a) upon due application; 
(b) with his or her consent; or 
(c) without his or her consent, but for good reasons and without 











of justice, be transferred upon the recommendation and direction of the 
Commission. 
(2)The Director-General shall, upon direction of the Commission, effect 
the transfer of a magistrate. 
Magistrates can therefore still be transferred without their consent. However, the 
power to recommend magistrates' transfers was removed from the Inspectorate 
Division. Instead, now such recommendation will normally be made by the 
Regional Court President or Chief Magistrate [Cluster Head] concerned, for 
consideration by the Magistrates Commission (email from the secretary of the 
Magistrates Commission 20/10/2005). Significantly, the Magistrates 
Commission's role is merely advisory and the final decision still rests with a 
political appointee, the Director-General. 
5.2.2.2 Security of tenure and remuneration 
Section 13(1) of the Magistrates Act, 1993 states that magistrates' tenure is 
secured until the age of 65. But despite the removal of the magistracy from the 
public service in 1993 their salaries were, until recently, still linked to those of 
public servants. In its report on the rationalization process of the courts compiled 
in 2001, the Magistrates Commission recommended that the courts should be 
given full financial and administrative independence in order that their budget 
should not be linked to the budget of a government ministry or department 
(Magistrates Commission, 2001: 4). 
The report raised more general concerns that magistrates' salaries were linked to 
those of public servants albeit through a 'historical accident' (Magistrates 
Commission, 2001: 9). Although remuneration was determined by the Minister 
after consultation with the Commission, the actual state of affairs was that the 
Department of Justice formulated its personnel expenditure budget after a 











funding of salaries for magistrates was thus provided together with the budget for 
entire public service section of the Department. The implication of this was that 
the Minister's determination of magistrates' salaries was in fact entirely 
dependent on increases agreed on in the bargaining process for public servants. 
Neither magistrates nor the Commission were represented at this bargaining 
process (Magistrates Commission, 2001: 9). In addition, acting magistrates (who 
are usually retired magistrates brought back in to service on a temporary basis), 
entered into service agreements with the DOJ for payment of salaries and other 
service conditions and were regarded as employees of the Department (Tladi 
and Myburgh, 2004:2). 
Changes to these processes were effected by the implementation of the Judicial 
Officers (Conditions of Service) Amendment Act 28 of 2003. The funding for 
magistrates' salaries is no longer dealt with as part of the entire public service or 
as part of the budget of the DOJ and the definition of magistrate was amended to 
include acting or temporary magistrate. Instead of the Minister of Justice, the 
President now determines the salary scales after taking into consideration the 
recommendations of the Independent Commission for the Remuneration of 
Public Office-bearers (Section 12 (1 )(a)(i) of the Magistrates Act 90 of 1993). 
The Act also amended the Independent Commission for the Remuneration of 
Public Office-bearers Act, 1997, so as to extend the definition of "office-bearer" to 
include judges and magistrates (preamble to the Judicial Officers (Conditions of 
Service) Amendment Act 28 of 2003). 
5.2.2.3 Personal immunity from civil suits 
Another recommendation raised in the Magistrates Commission's report of 2001, 
was that of judicial immunity and privilege and that magistrates' indemnification 
and immunity should be stated in legislation, and should be the same as that of 
judges (Magistrates Commission, 2001 :14). Despite these proposals, 











5.2.2.4 Magistrates' own perceptions of judicial independence 
Perhaps one of the most interesting (although unintended) insights revealed 
through the interview process with magistrates was their response to the 
question 'what are the key elements of transformation of the magistracy in your 
opinion?' The assumption was that independence would be named by all 
interviewees when in fact not one person identified it as a major benchmark of 
the transformation process. When further probed, the responses fell broadly into 
two categories; one group felt that they had always been independent and free 
from interference by the executive, and the other responded that the level of 
independence from the Department of Justice at this stage is merely 'window-
dressing'. Both categories of responses present an insight into magistrates' 
engagement with their independence and by implication with their past. In 
different ways both these responses seem to confirm that magistrates have 
indeed not grappled significantly with their relationship with the state in the past 
and nor do they have a collective sense of what their independence is (or should 
be). 
Magistrates' conceptions of independence were further revealed when the 
interviewees were confronted with the question: 'who would you say is your 
employer?' Only one magistrate ('Brown') responded without hesitation that she 
saw herself 'as being a part of the judicial branch of government' and that she 
'follow[s] section 165(2) of the Constitution'. Others were less certain about their 
responses to this question. The following four comments seem to sum up the 
general feeling of the other respondents: 
'I don't know who my employer is. There are no structures in place to 
make 1993 do-able ... Strictly speaking we are still public servants' 
(Magistrate 'Dlamini'). 











'The Minister of Justice ... No ... the Magistrates Commission ... 1 don't know 
who I am working for ... the Minister appoints me, the Commission deals 
with me ... the Department pays me ... ' (Magistrate 'de Kock'). 
'They [the Department of Justice] just don't want to relinquish their power 
over us' (Magistrate 'Lombard'). 
These statements confirm that there is still a lack of certainty regarding the 
relationship between the Department of Justice and the magistracy. The 
amendments to their conditions of service in 2003 which entrenched their status 
as public office-bearers should have provided a clearer sense that magistrates 
should no longer consider themselves as employees. The comments also reflect 
the validity of some of the concerns raised by Franco and Powell and the 
Magistrates Commission in their discussions of the continuing lack of judicial 
independence of the magistracy. 
5.3 Professionalisation and transformation of the magistracy 
We have suggested that the ongoing changes to the magistracy, particularly their 
removal from the public service and their improved security of tenure, may also 
be considered in terms of the general process of increased professionalisation. 
Crucial to that process, and closely associated to the principle of judicial 
independence, are the development of notions and practices of professional 
autonomy and self-government. Typically these are associated with 
requirements for specialised training and qualifications, the formation of 
professional associations and the development of a code of ethics to govern the 
professional practice (Carr-Saunders, 1966:2). We will briefly consider the 












5.3.1 Professional Qualifications, Education and Training 
An essential element of professionalisation is the acquisition of specialist skills 
and formal knowledge which are usually recognized through credentials awarded 
by a university (Carr-Sauders, 1966:2). In the case of the South African 
magistracy this is a relatively recent development. Historically magistrates had 
entered the civil service with few specialist skills or formal qualifications and 
worked their way through the system on the basis of state-sponsored courses at 
Justice College as well as by acquiring experiential knowledge. Formal legal 
qualifications or university degrees were not a requirement for becoming a 
magistrate, and appointment as a magistrate was generally through internal 
promotion (from the ranks of clerks or prosecutors) rather than external 
recruitment (Kgalema and Gready, 2000:3). The situation changed somewhat 
with the creation of the regional courts in the 1950s whose presiding officers 
were required to have an LLB or Public Service Senior Law Certificate (Section 
9(b) of the Magistrates Courts Act 32 of 1944), but until very recently district court 
magistrates (the majority of magistrates) were not required to be legally qualified. 
With the ongoing professionalisation of the magistracy that position has changed 
significantly. The current minimum qualification required by all magistrates is a 
law degree, e.g. a Dip luris, B luris, Dip Legum or LLB (email from the Secretary 
of the Magistrates Commission 31/1/2007). This is not yet stated in the 
Magistrates Court Act or in the Regulations, but is current practice within the 
Magistrates Commission. Furthermore, regional court magistrates are now 
required to have seven years of appropriate experience as well as the necessary 
degree (email from the Secretary of the Magistrates Commission 31/1/2007). 
In other ways, too, professional qualifications for the magistracy have been 
formalized. The Regulations for Judicial Officers requires magistrates to be 'fit 











Justice College and to have sat for 6 months as a temporary or candidate 
magistrate (Sections 3(1) f (i) and (ii) of the Regulations for Judicial Officers). 
Continuing education is another essential element of professionalisation, as the 
magistrates need to keep current with developments in the field (Carr-Saunders, 
1966: 14). This is sustained through courses offered by Justice College, the 
official training institution of the Department of Justice, as well as ARMSA and 
JOASA. The magistrates who were interviewed also reported that many 
magistrates make use of emails to colleagues or the associations' websites to 
post queries about case law or other legal matters. 
The shift to a requirement for formal legal qualifications implies that the status of 
magistrates has been enhanced as has their capacity to deal with complex legal 
matters. It has also opened up recruitment to advocates and attorneys 
encouraging a change in the profile of magistrates. 
These important changes to the status and quality of magistrates still need to be 
acknowledged though amendments to the Magistrates Court Act 1944 and to the 
Regulations. According to the Secretary for the Commission, there is no 
immediate plan to amend the Regulations as there are a number of other issues 
to be addressed that will take time to finalize and the Commission does not want 
to amend these in a 'piecemeal manner' (email from Secretary of the Magistrates 
Commission 31/1/2007). In the same email, the Secretary states that the 
Commission requested 'some time ago' that the Department amend the 
applicable section to refer merely to a 'fit and proper person' as in the case with 
judges but no decision has been taken yet. 
5.3.2 The development of a professional code of ethics 
The development of a professional code of ethics within any profession 











as for legitimacy in the eyes of those outside the profession (Moore, 1970: 115) 
Professional Codes of Ethics regulate conduct and protect both the magistracy 
as an institution as well as those who use the courts. (Carr-Saunders, 1966: 
14). The South African judiciary, together with a number of judiciaries 
worldwide, has recently focused its attention on issues of regulating judicial 
conduct. Three international codes which South Africa has adopted, have 
recently been developed and support the South African judiciary's own internal 
codes. 
The three international codes are: 
• The Latimer House Principles and Guidelines (1998) 
• The Limassol Conclusions (2002) 
• The 8angalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (2003) 
The two national ethical guidelines are the Code of Conduct for Magistrates 
(1994) and Judicial Ethics in South Africa (Guidelines for Judges). The latter 
document has not yet been promulgated, but was created out of a need for a 
more detailed guideline than the Code of Conduct (Franco and Miller, 2004: 3). 
The Magistrates' Code of Conduct binds all magistrates in South Africa and 
covers the same general principles as laid out in the international guidelines 
above. Magistrates are also bound by the Magistrates Oath is set out in Section 
9 (2) (a) of the Magistrates' Courts Act No. 32 of 1944: 
"I, .............................. (full name) .......................... . 
do hereby swear/solemnly affirm that in my capacity as a judicial officer I 
will be faithful to the Republic of South Africa, will uphold and protect the 
Constitution and the human rights entrenched in it, and will administer 
justice to all persons alike without fear, favour or prejudice, in accordance 
with the Constitution and the law." 
The codes of conduct and affiliation to international norms of standards of 
behaviour indicate a distinct shift towards an acceptance of the need for judicial 











5.3.3 Formation of Professional Associations 
The formation of professional associations acts as an authenticating agency for 
the collective - in this case the magistracy. Affiliation to these bodies allows for 
professional conduct to be brought under peer review and assists with protecting 
the reputation of the collective group (Moore, 1970:116). In addition, professional 
associations sustain the professional culture (Carr-Saunders, 1966: 9). 
Magistrates have two professional organisations that represent them - the 
Judicial Officers Association of South Africa (JOASA) and the Association of 
Regional Magistrates of South Africa (ARMSA). Both organisations are 
recognised by Section 41 of the Regulations for Judicial Officers of 1994. 
JOASA is a voluntary association that was set up in 1996 and held its first annual 
general conference in February 1997. It represents some 1200 judicial officers, 
mainly magistrates in the district courts but also some in the regional courts. 
ARMSA was established in 1995 and represents about ninety-five percent of all 
regional courts magistrates. 
The improved status of the South African magistracy internationally can be seen 
in its acceptance in international associations such as the Commonwealth 
Magistrates and Judges Association and the International Association of Judges. 
The International Association of Women Judges has also recently opened a 
South African Chapter. 
5.3.4 Selection and appointment 
Magistrates are selected through an interview process with members of the 
Magistrates Commission. These interviews are held in private. The Commission 











and there is thus no precedent in this regard. The Secretary of the Commission 
did not foresee that there would be any objection should such a request be 
received (email from the Secretary of the Magistrates Commission 22/1/2007). 
Transparency in the process is therefore implied, although that has not at this 
stage been acted on. 
5.4 Accountability 
A core characteristic of a democracy is that justice must be seen to be delivered 
in a manner that is not only fair and according to law, but that is also responsive 
and accountable to the society it serves (Russell, 1996:1). However, in the case 
of a magistracy with judicial independence that cannot be ensured through 
electoral processes. The challenge for any judiciary lies in balancing 
accountability with independence. 
Judicial officers wield enormous power and make decisions that affect important 
aspects of people's lives such as their freedom, poverty, housing etc. Because 
of their public prominence, power and influence, their performance should be 
subject to appropriate accountability mechanisms (Cameron, 1990: 252-253). 
Elements of accountability, like those of independence, should be both internal 
and external. Internal mechanisms for accountability include both the review and 
appeal process within the courts system, the adherence to codes of ethics for 
judicial officers, the rules of professional associations, and the oversight 
structures for discipline implemented by the Magistrates Commission. External 
mechanisms include the need for transparency in the selection and appointment 
process (Dung, 2003:28). They also include the right of the public to observe 
court proceedings and to have access to court records, the freedom of the press 
to criticise the judiciary and the appointment of lay assessors to the courtS.12 The 
public also have the right to lay complaints against magistrates. 
12 For a detailed discussion on the lay assessor system see Jeremy Seekings with Christina Murray 1998: 
Lay Assessors in South Africa's Magistrates' Courts. Occassional Paper for the Law, Race and Gender 











5.4.1 Complaints and disciplinary structures 
Complaints against magistrates are referred to the Magistrates Commission's 
Ethics Committee. The process for investigation is spelt out in the Regulations 
and includes an investigation process followed by a public hearing if so required. 
Writing on accountability and the South African judiciary, Peter Russell (1996: 12) 
suggests that there is a need for well-publicized notices with respect to how 
complaints have been dealt with; the information needs to be easily available to 
all court users and the Magistrates Commission should be required to report 
annually. He emphasizes that this is not in order to name names, but rather to 
give the public an idea of the volume, type of complaint and manner in which it 
has been dealt with. This suggestion might well be good for instilling greater 
public confidence in the magistracy as well as being in the interests of 
transparency and accountability. It could also act as a means to ensure timeous 
finalization of complaints. 
5.5 Concluding remarks 
The status of magistrates as professional judicial officers has improved 
considerably since the Magistrates Act of 1993 removed them from the civil 
service but significant challenges remain in entrenching their status as 
independent judicial officers. 
In general the consolidation of the magistracy's independence from the 
Department of Justice remains incomplete and a number of key concerns 
regarding their location in relation to the executive still need to be dealt with. The 
views of magistrates as well as the experiences of lay assessors. It compares the attitudes and perceptions 











Minister still retains far too much power with respect to critical decisions affecting 
magistrates and his/her discretionary powers should be reconsidered. 
Most of the challenges and concerns around independence and security of 
tenure could easily be addressed by the Commission's own suggestion in 2001 
that the entire judiciary (magistrates and judges) be constituted as 'a separate 
institution with its own manifest identity'. (Magistrates Commission, 2001: 4). The 
Department of Justice seems reluctant to recognize the improved status of 
magistrates as professional judicial officers. This has implications for the 
magistracy's own morale and perceptions of their status and may affect general 
public confidence. The continued separation between the status of judicial 
officers in the higher and lower courts is artificial and no longer relevant in an 
environment where magistrates are no longer public servants. 
The role of the Quality Assurance Division should be reconsidered. It should 
either be acknowledged that its creation was to ensure that former Inspectors 
were not purged from their posts, and that the Division therefore has a limited 
lifespan as an institution; or if is it to continue as an institution, an open 
discussion should be held with all district court magistrates as to their concerns 
and suggestions. The role of the Inspectorate in the past has yet to be discussed 
or publicly acknowledged. Creating a forum for dialogue would allow for 
perceptions of distrust and other concerns to be addressed. This would also 
assist in enhancing the status of the Magistrates Commission in the eyes of the 
magistrates themselves. 
The will of the current leadership of the magistracy to drive the process of 
addressing outstanding issues is unclear - both with regard to the present 
incumbents and through the uneven weighting of the Commission with political 
appointees. In the Commission's 2001 report, it was acknowledged that "there is 
a perception amongst some magistrates that the Magistrates Commission is 











that " ... even if this perception is warranted, the ineffectiveness is not attributable 
to the members of the Commission in their personal capacities" (Magistrates 
Commission, 2001:10). It may be the case that the provisions of the Magistrates 
Act of 1993 limit the power of the Commission and that final decision making 
powers still rest with the Minister, but the Commission could develop more 
effective strategies to ensure that their recommendations receive the necessary 
attention or response from the Minister. There are eight political appointees on 
the Commission who could certainly lobby for swifter responses from the 
Minister. One of the political appointees is in fact the Head of the Justice Portfolio 
Committee in Parliament. Amongst other responsibilities, this Committee is 
responsible for monitoring and holding government departments accountable and 
has the authority to summons anyone to appear before them. They could use 
these powers to make the process of the Minister's delay or rejection of 
recommendations more transparent. 
There is also no legislative or other impediment to the Magistrates Commission 
determining and implementing its own policies and strategies for institutional 
transformation; yet since its 2001 report on the rationalisation on the courts no 
further progress, nor follow-up reports have been produced. If, as stated in the 
Commission's submission to the TRC, the role of the Commission is to be 'a 
watchdog jealously guarding the independence of the magistracy.' (Magistrates 
Commission submission to the TRC: 4), then the Commission should be far more 
proactive in ensuring that all aspects of independence are indeed attained. 
The Secretary of the Magistrates Commission's response on page 85 that they 
are waiting for the 'consultation process' that 'we assume' will start in 2007 
indicates the Magistrates Commission has not taken responsibility for devising 
its own strategies and processes, waiting instead for leadership from the 
Department and/or Minister of Justice. This might also be a consequence of the 











In its judgement in the Van Rooyen matter, the High Court seems to support this 
view: 
'Insofar as the Magistrates Commission has any role to play in taking 
decisions, making its views known to the Minister or making 
recommendations ... it is unlikely to take any decisions, express any views 
or make recommendations which do not find favour with the Minister' (Van 












CONCLUDING REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
6.1 Transforming the Magistracy: How Far Have We Come? 
In the last fourteen years the political landscape has changed dramatically in 
South Africa. Since the first democratic elections in 1994, government authority is 
now exercised legitimately and government is committed to adherence to the rule 
of law rather than rule by law. The Constitution of 1996 affirmed the concept of 
separation of powers and entrenches the independence of the judiciary - both 
that of judges and of magistrates. As we have seen in the preceding chapters, a 
number of key legislative and institutional changes, such as the removal of 
magistrates from the public service, the establishment of the Magistrates 
Commission, and the implementation of the cluster system also took place in 
order to ensure magistrates were no longer a part of the civil service subject to 
the executive and further securing their independence. 
But in order to answer the question 'how far have we come' in transforming the 
magistracy we need to look at the internationally recognised standards of judicial 
independence as benchmarks by which to evaluate the progress to date. We will 
briefly consider the core elements identified in Chapter 5 in order to answer the 
question. 
6.1.1 External independence 
This principle requires that judicial officers must be independent, impartial and 
free from external political or other interference. In terms of their institutional 
location and in exercising their judicial decision-making role, magistrates have 
been provided with sufficient security for them to act independently. Provisions 











the separation of administrative and judicial functions, the autonomous power of 
cluster heads and chief magistrates under the cluster system. But in practice 
external independence has not yet been effectively ensured. External 
independence requires a complete lack of interference from the executive, and in 
particular from the Department of Justice. However, the current institutional 
arrangements indicate a heavy reliance on decisions by the Minister for a 
number of critical issues relating to the conditions of service for the magistracy. 
Although, unlike the High Court, the Constitutional Court decision in Van Rooyen 
found the magistracy's institutional independence to be adequate, practice 
indicates that the Minister can, and does, ignore the Magistrates Commission's 
recommendations. The Magistrates Commission also relies on the Minister and 
Department of Justice to lead them in most matters concerning magistrates. It 
may well be time to reconsider the composition of the Commission in order to 
decrease the direct and indirect control of the executive and governing party on 
their activities. Both the Hoexter and Law Commissions recommended structures 
that were far more independent, with minimal involvement of the Department. A 
Commission which is largely representative of the judiciary, the legal profession 
and civil society would be less controversial and may better serve the interests of 
the magistracy. 
6.1.2 Internal independence 
Internal independence requires magistrates to be independent from their 
colleagues and vertical and horizontal bosses and that in terms of their judicial 
decision-making; they should never receive direct authoritarian instruction. 
Magistrates appear to have had some success with entrenching internal 
independence specifically through their removal from the civil service. The cluster 
system has allowed magistrates to manage themselves through the designation 
of decision-making authority to cluster heads and chief magistrates. This internal 
restructuring has also delegated administrative duties to court managers. 











and are no longer reliant on merit awards from the Department for promotion or 
salary increases. In the preceding chapter we discussed the concerns about the 
Quality Assurance Division. Although structurally it is an acceptable monitoring 
mechanism, its composition and history raise concerns about potential influence 
on internal independence. It may be that these concerns are based only on 
perceptions and have nothing to do with actual practice, but they do need to be 
addressed. 
6.1.3 Security of tenure and remuneration, protection from arbitrary 
transfer and personal immunity from civil suits 
The fundamental protections of security of tenure and remuneration have been 
secured and with that, the professional status of magistrates enhanced. The fact 
that two internationally recognized core elements of independence, namely 
protection from arbitrary transfer and personal immunity from civil suits, have not 
yet been sufficiently addressed is a matter of concern. It remains for magistrates 
themselves to confront their lack of protection from arbitrary transfer and 
immunity, both of which could easily be effected through a challenge in the courts 
should an unwanted transfer be demanded or a civil suit implemented against a 
magistrate. 
6.2 Recommendations for Further Research 
As we have discovered, there is a serious absence of research into the 
magistracy in South Africa and as a result there are numerous research projects 
that could be undertaken focussing on a variety of topics and concerns. 
Research reports could assist further transformation of the magistracy by acting 
as a catalyst for further developments and change. As a result of this research 











6.2.1. Dealing with the past 
The chapter on the TRC Special legal hearings as well as the interview material 
indicated a general reluctance of magistrates to recognise and acknowledge their 
role under the apartheid government. Interview material indicated engagement 
with the past was generally selective and self-serving interspersed with a few 
honest acknowledgements of the situation as it was. The benefit of time and 
hindsight might well allow for an honest and valuable assessment of their role in 
an in-depth and comprehensive investigation into the past. Addressing the past 
is fundamentally interlinked with addressing the challenges of the present and 
the future. It might also serve the magistracy well to convene a process of 
institutional introspection and review. The TRC moment has passed, but a similar 
process which engages with looking at the past as well as assessing the 
advances that have been made could assist the magistracy in addressing current 
concerns about racism, the Quality Assurance Division, the leadership and role 
of the Magistrates Commission as well as clarify magistrates' own sense of 
independence, accountability and professionalism. 
6.2.2 Comparative study 
A number of the issues and concerns affecting the South African magistracy 
relate to the fact that the system has its roots in a colonial past, and are not only 
the result of apartheid government policy - for example the fact that they were 
civil servants and not required to be legally qualified is a common characteristic 
of magistrates in all former British colonies (Mack and Roach Anleu, 2006: 374; 
Russell, 2007:9). 
Several other former British colonies - such as Australia, Canada and India -
have also been faced with transforming a former colonial judicial system into one 
that is more desirable in terms of international norms; the main difference being 











brief investigation into the situation in Australia and Canada revealed that the 
dearth of literature and research into the magistracy is not unique to the South 
African situation. Australia has slightly more readily available recent research 
literature since the establishment of the Magistrates Research Project at Flinders 
University in 2000. Research reports from this Project indicate that there are a 
number of similarities to South Africa in how transformation has been 
implemented in Australia. The magistrates' courts were retained as lower courts 
in both name and function and although magistrates' professional statuses have 
improved considerably a number of concerns remain with regard to their 
independence (See for example Mack, K & Roach Anleu, S. 2006. The Security 
of Tenure of Australian Magistrates). 
The Canadian reforms were somewhat different in that the institutional 
restructuring introduced in the mid-60s did away with the magistrates' courts 
which were replaced by a provincial court system (Russell, 2007:10). Courts are 
now staffed by a legally trained judiciary whose qualifications almost match those 
of the federal (superior court) judges. Their conditions of service and status 
approach those of federal judges, so much so that the current debate in Canada 
is whether the distinction between lower courts and superior courts should be 
abolished entirely (email to the researcher from Peter Russell 8/1/2007). 
It seems that different approaches have been taken with respect to the 
transformation of the magistracy in former British colonies. It may not be feasible 
to engage in any comprehensive comparative survey, but it is possible to look at 
the main approaches with a view to identify similarities and differences. It might 












6.3 Concluding remarks 
Whilst the constitutional and institutional principles for independence may have 
been put into place, the persistence of past practice and attitudes in many ways 
suggests that transformation of the magistracy still has some way to go. Despite 
their increased professionalism, magistrates still do not command the same 
respect as judges and the Department seems unwilling to address outstanding 
concerns regarding independence with any haste. Contrary to the assertions of 
the Magistrates Commission that they 'guard the independence of the 
magistracy', they have not been particularly proactive in ensuring that all the 
requirements of independence are met. At the same time, magistrates 
themselves appear to be struggling with asserting their independence and seem 
content to wait for direction from the Commission or the Department. Magistrates 
should challenge the leadership offered by the Magistrates Commission in 
addressing their concerns and insist on a far more robust and active approach to 
matters of continuing transformation. 
But despite these shortcomings, independence and transformation of the 
magistracy should be seen as an evolving process. Transformation of the 
magistracy as an institution is not an easy task and criticism of its pace should be 
tempered with an understanding of the associated demands. Entrenching the 
independence of the magistracy requires legislative and institutional changes that 
cannot be implemented overnight. It is also a sizeable institution which demands 
considerable administrative support which must be balanced with protecting 
magistrates' independence. With time, it is likely that several of the issues 
mentioned in this chapter will be challenged either through the courts, or through 
institutional adaptations, further changing or clarifying the institutional status of 
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